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Abstract 
 The 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines of the Russian Federation, as planning documents 
for the armed forces, have been influenced and guided, both directly and indirectly, by the recent 
regional conflicts in Georgia and Crimea, as well as by the ongoing ‘New Look’ military 
reforms.  The perceived threat by Russia of the continued eastward expansion by NATO into 
their periphery and region of influence not only provided the impetus for military action, but the 
deliberate inclusion of NATO as a military threat and main external danger in both doctrines.  
From the Russian perspective, the expansion of NATO and infringement in their sphere of 
influence can only be dissuaded by show of force, and as a result, the desire to protect its 
national interests and regional hegemony is reflected prominently in the doctrines.  The ‘New 
Look’ military reforms on the other hand, regardless of the radical and sweeping changes on the 
structure and posture of the armed forces, had very little impact on either doctrine.   In complete 
contradiction both documents continued to stress the requirements of a Soviet-style mobilization 
reserve and other such aspects similar to the pre-reform Russian military force.  As a result, the 
current military doctrine has left the present-day Russian armed forces, specifically the ground 
forces, contending with how to confront the continued threat of NATO expansion and prepare 
for future regional conflicts, while attempting to strike the appropriate balance between a 
smaller, permanent-readiness force, and a large mobilization army.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Russia is only respected and has its interests considered when the country is strong and stands 
firmly on its own feet.  
—Vladimir Putin, Russia and the Changing World 
 
 
 The Russian Federation, since the beginning of the 21
st
 century, has been involved 
militarily in several large-scale regional conflicts.  The Second Chechen conflict, with the battle 
and insurgency phase lasting almost ten years, provided a renewed emphasis on the need for a 
more modern—both qualitatively and quantitatively—military, and a relevant military doctrine 
which fit within the larger requirements of the national security strategy.  Amid worsening 
tensions between the Republic of Georgia and their breakaway neighbors of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, Russian air and ground forces launched a full-scale invasion of the region, albeit in 
response to initial Georgian actions and with the announced intentions of peacekeeping and 
protecting the citizens of the region, to include native Russians and those granted Russian 
citizenship.  Though the operation achieved the ultimately desired effect of preventing Georgian 
forces from entering either autonomous region, militarily the conflict highlighted the still present 
command and control—and technological—flaws of both the Russian ground and air forces.  As 
a result, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov presented a series of drastic military 
reforms, followed shortly by a new military doctrine in 2010.   
 For the next several years changes were implemented, though often with stiff resistance 
from the military itself.  New equipment and weapons systems were introduced, and the structure 
and size of the military—virtually unchanged since Soviet times—received an unprecedented 
overhaul in line with other contemporary mobile and deployable forces.  The Russian military 
also profited from a steadily increasing budget, which has become one of the major portions of 
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national expenditure.  All of this came to fruition in the early months of 2014 when the sustained 
political protests in Ukraine resulted in the removal of the Russian-friendly government.  Under 
the guise of both being ‘invited’ and protecting native Russians, ground forces of the Russian 
Federation quickly, and with precision, seized control of Crimea.  The ability of the Russian 
military to execute the operation, both in terms of forward-deploying multiple mobile forces and 
in command and control, was on par with any contemporary Western-military operation.  
Compared to operations a mere fourteen years earlier in Chechnya, it signified the emergence of 
a new, and more adaptable, Russian military.   
 As the situation in Crimea dissolved into a separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine, and 
amid the escalation of tensions between Russia and the Western powers (NATO), a new military 
doctrine emerged in December 2014.  Though similar in spirit to the previous doctrine, the new 
doctrine conveys a more defensive posture with expressed interest in protecting Russian 
nationals in the immediate periphery of the border.  The new doctrine also stresses the use of 
more advance technology in both offensive and defensive systems and a stated objective of 
reestablishing dominance within the Arctic.  Of most concern is the unstated threat—as 
perceived by Russia—of the expanding NATO presence along their borders.  Though denied by 
the Kremlin, their escalating involvement and support both in weapons and troops, as well as 
financial aid, for the separatists in eastern Ukraine can only be ascertained as the execution of the 
new Russian military doctrine.  The renewed flights of long-range bombers, the almost brazen 
interdictions by Russian interceptors of NATO aircraft and the increased patrols of the Black Sea 
Fleet into the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean can also be viewed as the new stance of the 
Russian military acting within the guidance of the doctrine.  Though these military actions had 
previously been operational, with the new 2014 military doctrine it provides Russia with—at 
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least to them—a legitimate and warranted use of their military force operating against a 
perceived threat to their national security. 
 This thesis attempts to examine the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation and the resulting change and progression which has occurred by correlating the 
structural and equipment changes in the Russian military as a result of the 2008 military reforms, 
and the two recent ground campaigns in Georgia and Crimea/Eastern Ukraine.  The 2008 conflict 
in Georgia—though a Russian victory—highlighted the long overdue need for military reform, 
and shortly afterwards the ‘New Look’ reforms were initiated, followed shortly in 2010 by the 
first new military doctrine in over a decade.  With most of the military reforms in place, in the 
spring of 2014 Russian occupied and annexed Crimea with a very mobile and professional 
military force.  Amid rising tension with the West and NATO, and an escalating proxy-war in 
Eastern Ukraine, on 26 December 2014 Russia released the current 2014 Military Doctrine.  By 
comparing the changes of the 2014 Military Doctrine from the former 2010 document, 
development and current status of the military reforms and conflict performance in Georgia and 
Crimea/Eastern Ukraine with an emphasis on the ground forces, examining the evolution of the 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation and the influence of coinciding military reform and 
relevant regional conflicts is possible. 
 Russian military doctrine and Russian military reform since the 2008 Russian-Georgian 
war raises several questions to be researched and answered within the constraints of this analysis.  
First, how has the recent 2014 Russian military doctrine evolved from the major 2010 doctrine?  
What are the major similarities and differences?  Are there any overarching themes?  Second, 
how has the evolution of the doctrine been influenced by conflicts in Georgia and 
Crimea/Ukraine?  Did the impetus for the uses of military force, the resulting military action and 
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the corresponding geopolitical climate provide a catalyst for the new doctrines?  Third, have the 
doctrines coincided with the ongoing 2008 ‘new look’ military reforms?  Are stated goals such 
as increased combat readiness, organizational restructuring and modernization of weapons and 
equipment reflected in the military doctrines?  Lastly, what is the status and direction of the 
Russian ground forces after the military reforms, and under the current military doctrine?  Have 
they been able to incorporate these internal and external demands and translate them into a viable 
force?  What is the future direction of this force?    
 The 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines of the Russian Federation, as planning documents 
for the armed forces, have been influenced and guided, both directly and indirectly, by the recent 
regional conflicts in Georgia and Crimea, as well as the ongoing military reforms, though the 
extent of this influence varied from overt and deliberate in the Georgian case, to rather 
contradictory and incompatible in the Crimean case.  The perceived threat by Russia of the 
continued eastward expansion by NATO and other western institutions into their periphery and 
region of influence not only provided the impetus for military action, but the deliberate inclusion 
of NATO as a military threat and main external danger in both doctrines.  This increased tension 
towards NATO also resulted in an elevated posture on nuclear deterrence, and a stronger and 
more obvious assertion of a Russian sphere of privileged interest.  The regional conflicts also 
contributed to a renewed interest in the doctrines for the protection of not only Russian citizens 
abroad, but Russian-speakers as well, and the authorization to use military forces for that 
purpose.  From the Russian perspective, the expansion of NATO and infringement in their sphere 
of influence can only be dissuaded by show of force, and as a result, the desire to protect its 
national interests and regional hegemony is reflected prominently in the doctrines. 
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 The ‘New Look’ military reforms on the other hand, regardless of the radical and 
sweeping changes on the structure and posture of the armed forces, had very little impact on 
either doctrine.   Beginning in late 2008, the reforms were the most aggressive overhaul of the 
Russian military since its establishment in 1992, creating new rapidly deployable brigade-sized 
permanent-readiness forces composed of a much smaller force utilizing new and modernized 
equipment.  Despite this, in complete contradiction, both documents continued to stress the 
requirements of a Soviet-style mobilization reserve and other such aspects similar to the pre-
reform Russian military force, for both the operational forces, as well as in the economic and 
defense sectors, while at the same time containing nuanced mentions of military reform 
concepts.  As a result of these influencing factors, the current military doctrine has left the 
present-day Russian armed forces, specifically the ground forces, contending with how to 
confront the continued threat of NATO expansion and prepare for future regional conflicts, while 
attempting to strike the appropriate balance between a smaller, permanent-readiness force, and a 
large mobilization army.  
Existing Literature 
 The defense analysis community has discussed and analyzed various dimensions of the 
Russian military doctrine, coinciding military reform and the relevant regional conflicts.  There 
have been scholarly contributions to the developments of the individual military doctrines, 
military reform and their implications, as well as extensive writings concerning the conflicts in 
Georgia and Ukraine, though with a lesser amount of material on the recent actions in Crimea.  
Because military doctrine includes a wide range of issues, there is no coherent single theme in 
the existing literature, however in the following summary some of the major issues will be 
presented and addressed. 
6 
 
 
 The development of the doctrine, both in the early stages after the creation of the Russian 
Federation, and the later drafts of 2000 and 2010 has been widely written about and analyzed.  
Marcel De Haas
1
, in his analysis of Soviet, CIS and Russian military doctrines from 1990 until 
2000, argued that the development of the military doctrine demanded an important role in any 
study of Russian security policy, due to its reflection of current and future policy.  He tracked the 
evolution of the doctrine and how it has adjusted to reflect current threats; the initial fear of a 
global war has evolved to include civil and religious war, as well as international crime and 
terrorism.  The doctrine, he noted, has always included ‘Russian citizens abroad,’ though it has 
slowly changed from those located in former Soviet republics to Russian citizens abroad in 
general.  Regardless, De Hass stressed that each military doctrine has reacted to the post-Cold 
War security policy of the West, which is seen as a security threat to Russia.   
 In a more dated piece, Mary E. Glantz
2
, daughter of renowned Soviet military historian 
David Glantz, also analyzed the military doctrine, though focusing primarily on the argument 
between parliament and the presidency over what constituted a threat to the new Russian 
Federation.  The continued eastward expansion of NATO was the primary concern of Yury 
Baluyevsky when he analyzed the 2010 Russian military doctrine.  Baluyevsky noted two major 
events, the first being the refusal of the United States to constrain the development of a missile 
defense system and second, their material and declaratory support of Georgia during the 2008 
conflict, as chief reasons for this transition.  Russia as well reacted in their doctrine to the 
continued option of the United States for using their nuclear weapons for a preventative strike, as 
                                                 
1
 Marcel de Haas, “An Analysis of Soviet, CIS and Russian Military Doctrines 1990-2000,” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 14, no. 4 (2001). 
 
2
 Mary E. Glantz, “The Origins and Development of Soviet and Russian Military Doctrine,” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 7, no. 3 (1994). 
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Russia stated that their nuclear weapons were for defensive purposes only.  He noted as well that 
this defensive nuclear deterrence formed the basis of the 2010 doctrine. 
 The 2010 military doctrine within the National Security Strategy was a concern of 
Gregory P. Lannon when he examined the ‘New Look’ reforms of the army and the effect on 
foreign policy.  He argued that the current reforms of the military had limited their influence 
globally, and as a result introduced a new ‘southern’ foreign policy, which focused more on the 
Caucasus region.  He claimed—contrary to others—that the threat of NATO and China have 
been relegated below those posed by the Caucasus region, even going so far as to argue that this 
southern region has defined Russian foreign policy and military thinking since the mid 1990s.  
He supported this claim by discussing the ‘New Look’ reforms, which have tailored the military 
to fight insurgent groups and smaller forces, and how the opposition to these reforms was 
lessened after the showing of the military in the Georgian war.  Though the Caucasus region is 
still important to Russia, the current political and military situation in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine have brought a renewed prevalence to NATO once again. 
 Several scholars have written on the continual issue of the role of military technology 
within developing Russian military theory.  Rod Thornton, in analyzing the Russian military in 
2008, argued that the military had been previously neglected due to the desires of the political 
leadership to reduce defense spending.  To support this claim, he reviewed the current situation 
of the Russian military and their actions in the Georgian conflict.  While acknowledging that  
compared to previous conflicts in Chechnya the military fared well, he claimed it was because 
the military utilized contract troops to do the actual fighting, while conscript troops continued to 
fill all other areas of the military not engaged in high profile actions.  Despite this, due to the 
neglect of the military, the Russian forces fighting in Georgia were both technically and 
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technologically inferior to their counterparts.
3
  He concluded by noting that though the Russian 
military could launch nuclear missiles or fight insurgent forces, they could not do much in 
between. 
 Though still looking at the transformation of technology in the Russian military, Tor 
Bukkvoll explored the three different schools of thought within the military on this sensitive 
subject.  These three ideologies—traditionalists, modernists and revolutionaries—all have 
different conceptions of how the military should evolve in regards to the balance of manpower 
reductions for greater technology in equipment.  While the traditionalists believe that new 
technologies will not revolutionize warfare, the revolutionaries—who want to make technology a 
priority—feel that warfare has changed forever and if Russia does not adapt they will be unable 
to defend their sovereignty in the future.  Caught in the middle, the modernists want to break 
with the previous Soviet model, and adopt a more balanced approach between technology and 
manpower.  Bukkvoll also discussed the contentious issue between the groups of either 
developing a military that responds to the West asymmetrically with a larger force, or responding 
in kind to the Western model by developing a technologically-heavy military.    
 Noted Russian and Soviet military expert Jacob W. Kipp, writing shortly after the 
formation of the 1993 Russian military doctrine, examined the changes in military doctrine and 
policy during this period.  Though dated, his examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
military forces of Russia and how the doctrine could influence their utilization is still relevant 
today.  Bettina Renz as well looked at the influence of the military doctrine on the deployment of 
                                                 
3
 Rod Thornton, “A Bear with Teeth?” The RUSI Journal 153, no. 5 (October 2008): 52. He noted several examples 
of decay in the military and how it became apparent during the conflict.  First, the overall maintenance of equipment 
was subpar, and as a result the movement of forces into South Ossetia was hampered by multiple vehicle 
breakdowns which blocked the already narrow roads.  Second, the technological quality of their equipment versus 
their Georgian counterparts was inferior.  Though both armies used similar models, the Georgian vehicles had been 
updated with night vision, advance fire control systems and all-weather capability. 
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the military, though she focused on the 2010 doctrine and the issues of manpower requirements.  
Using the Georgian conflict as a backdrop, she noted that the reforms instituted in 2008 sought to 
address previous issues the political will to develop a new and professional military is still 
insufficient.  Throughout the article, she argued that the new, modern Russian army will only be 
possible when Russia fully embraced the need to end conscription.  In addition, the Strategic 
Studies Institute has written several extensive studies about the modernization of the Russian 
military. 
 Though much scholarship exists on the aforementioned areas, it is the subject of military 
doctrine and military reform that has received the most attention.  Keir Giles, writing about 
Russian military transformation after 2011, analyzed several different facets of this 
transformation, and how these changes will provide a more adaptable and flexible force capable 
of meeting Russia’s foreign policy goals.  Giles noted that this reform has been accelerated as 
new senior leadership who support the reform process is in place in key posts.  To bolster his 
claim, he discussed the new structural changes in the military which consisted of the change to 
brigade formations from the previous division/regiment structure and the establishment of heavy, 
medium and light forces to meet evolving security threats.  He also examined the omnipresent 
issue of personnel and staffing with contract and conscription forces, and in turn the resulting 
issues of developing an NCO corps, as well as the hurdles of restructuring the professional 
military educational system.  Despite these obstacles, Giles noted that military leadership 
realized it would be the missile defense forces and information security which would be at the 
core of a more modern force, versus the previous reliance on mass mobilization to counter a land 
invasion by NATO.  Like Lannon, Giles argued the area of the north Caucasus will continue to 
be the focus of Russian operations. 
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 The International Institute of Strategic Studies annual Military Balance publication 
provided a section devoted to the ‘New Look’ reforms from 2008 until 2011.  In the 
examination, the IISS contributors evaluated the changes established by the Defense Minister to 
include the Ministry of Defense (MoD) becoming the main civilian oversight body of the 
military, as well as the reduction of the number of officers of all grades.  Also discussed was the 
reduction in the number of military districts and the introduction of the brigade system.  In 
addition, the threat of NATO was mentioned, and how even though it was not considered a 
threat, the continued development of military infrastructure closer to Russia’s borders could 
constitute a threat.   
 Roger N. McDermott as well analyzed Russian military reform, with a focus on the 
change in organization from divisions to brigades and how, he argued, this has almost removed 
the mass mobilization concept.  These reforms, as others have noted, is a result of the dismal 
showing of the military during the Georgian conflict and McDermott provided evidence of 
specific changes in terms of both more modern equipment and the mobilization and readiness of 
various military commands.  Though the issue of conscription versus contract had been 
prevalent, he noted that the transformation to a brigade structure, and with it the June 2009 
demonstration and testing of three tank brigades, was the final abandonment of the previous 
mass mobilization concept which relied completely on conscripts.   This structural change also 
brought with it new equipment and hardware, with the key units receiving these items first and 
then progressing throughout the remainder of the military.  He noted as well that the tank will 
continue to be the key feature of the ground forces.  He concluded that the most fundamental and 
ambitious military reform program in Russian since 1945 was in progress. 
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 Alexander Golts also examined military reform, but in the context of the Global War on 
Terrorism.  He argued that reform is required due to lack of modern equipment and growing 
internal social problems.  He also analyzed the current issue of mixed formations consisting of 
both conscript and contract soldiers, and he argued this needs to be a temporary fix, not a long-
term staffing solution, which is contrary to the MoD who still calls for a mobilization reserve in 
case of a massive war.  Unlike McDermott, Golts concluded that the Russian military cannot 
imagine anything but a military based in conscription and mass mobilization, with limited 
training by specialized officers, themselves only having limited technical training. 
 Several prominent Russian officials as well have produced analyses of their military 
doctrine.  General of the Army Makhmut Gareev, who is President of the Russian Academy of 
Military Sciences, wrote shortly after the 1992 draft doctrine about the options for Russia and the 
various paths that will be presented to them.  Though not arguing any particular point, he wrote 
of what future war might look like, and how a new doctrine needs to be developed which takes 
all these possibilities into account.  Andrei Makarychev and Alexander Sergunin, writing about 
the institutional, political and security implications of Russian military reform, argued that 
despite numerous setbacks and barriers to the efforts of reform, there have been certain 
successes.  They noted the clear shift from the traditional Soviet-style army to a more mobile, 
deployable and better equipped force.  This shift, they found, was due to Moscow’s radical 
change in threat perception and the abandonment of the previous Cold-war goals.  Makarychev 
and Sergunin noted these threats have moved from external to internal, which in turn requires a 
more mobile military.  Other reasons for reform they discussed were economic necessity and low 
combat readiness of the military, which along with lack of modern equipment, they blame for the 
degraded performance in Georgia and to a certain extent, Chechnya.   
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 Probably the most current scholarship on the Russian military doctrine and military 
reform has been completed by Bettina Renz.  Though she was previously mentioned for an 
article she wrote in 2008, she recently analyzed the Russian military capabilities after 20 years of 
multiple reforms, and included a discussion on military operations in Crimea.  She argued that 
though reform had been discussed and implemented, it was never actually completed.  The 2008 
reforms of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov were previously thought to be effectively dead 
after his resignation, but as she pointed out, the events in Crimea did not show an ineffective 
military force.  She claimed that the previous failures in Chechnya and the questionable results in 
Georgia versus the success in Crimea were a result of strategy, not a question of technological 
superiority.  She concluded that the previously flawed assumptions about Russian military 
reform have often led to exaggerated assessments of its inadequacy and downplaying the 
changes that have occurred, which the Russian operations in Crimea have shown to be otherwise.  
In addition, scholars such as military analyst Charles J. Dick, Russian and Eurasian military 
expert Stephen J. Blank and former Russian Security Council member Vladislav Chernov have 
written extensively about the various reforms in the Russian military since 1992. 
 The current literature engaged with a wide spectrum of topics within the larger context of 
the Russian military doctrines, regional conflicts, and military reform.  In relation to the military 
doctrines, issues arise as to their function as security and planning documents for the military, 
while another reoccurring theme is the concept of a threat in the documents, and how the 
expansion of NATO is expressed within this context.  However, the status and organization of 
the military, both before and after the reforms, occupied a large portion of the literature.  Most 
prominent was the need for reform of the operational structure from a mobilization force, to a 
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more permanent-readiness force.  In addition, the literature engaged with the debate over 
contract and conscript soldiers, as well as the required compromises during the reform process.            
 The chapters of this thesis explore the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines of the Russian 
Federation, the ongoing ‘New Look’ military reforms, the regional conflicts in Georgia and 
Crimea/Eastern Ukraine, and how these separate yet intertwined topics have influenced and 
altered one another, resulting in the Russian military we see today.  While the military doctrines, 
as well as the military reforms and regional conflicts, apply to the Russian Armed Forces as a 
whole, the primary focus of this project is on the Russian conventional ground forces, due to not 
only their size and prominence, but also the magnitude of the impact of the aforementioned 
factors upon them.  The first section will analyze these important subjects.  Chapter one 
investigates the 2010 and 2014 Military Doctrines of the Russian Federation in terms of 
similarities, differences and common themes.  Chapter two examines at the 2008 Russian-
Georgian War as a catalyst for reform, while chapter three will analyze the 2008 ‘New Look’ 
Military Reforms; the objectives of the reforms; and the status of reforms by 2012.  Chapter four 
examines the first demonstration of the reformed Russian ground forces during the 2014-2015 
Annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.  For both regional conflicts, the 
prelude to military intervention will be presented, as well as a brief timeline of the conflict and a 
brief analysis of the eventual outcome.   
 The second section is concerned with the assessment of these subjects.  Chapter five 
examines the influence of both the regional conflicts and military reform on the Military 
Doctrines; the subsequent increase in the perceived threat from NATO expansion and Western 
influence; and the contradicting position towards a permanent-readiness force.  Chapter six will 
conclude with the consequences of the aforementioned factors on the Russian military; the 
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current Russian ground forces post-Crimea/Ukraine, and their long-term presence and viability 
as a 21
st
 Century military force. 
 For this project, a wide range of scholarly journals and government publications were 
consulted.  Among the more prominent sources, this includes the Journal of Slavic Military 
Studies, European Security, Journal of Strategic Studies, RUSI Journal, and Defense and 
Security Analysis.  Multiple publications of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War 
College were examined as well.  In addition, both Russian and Western online news sources 
were used to provide critical current perspectives.  The thesis also makes use of Russian sources, 
to include the Moscow-based independent defense analysis publication Moscow Defense Brief, 
and several Russian-language sources, most prominently the 2014 Military Doctrine of the 
Russian Federation (not available in English as of this writing) and the Russian Ministry of 
Defense publication           Mysl’.    
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CHAPTER 1 
THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
 
Military Doctrine, as distinct from strategy, depicts how to employ military tools: what kinds of 
wars one plans to fight, and how one plans to fight them. 
—Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Cr m     d Russ  ’s Str t g c Overhaul 
 
 
 
 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation represents the views and objectives of 
the Russian Government as to how best prepare for, and protect, the Russian Federation from 
both external and internal threats.  Military doctrine itself is “neither a theory in general nor the 
views of individuals, but rather a system of views on defense issues officially adopted in a 
country.”4  The crucial role of this document is to “explain how armed forces of different kinds 
should fight.”5  In order to complete this task, the military doctrine “encompasses an extremely 
wide range of issues, beginning with military policy and ending with the organization of military 
service.”6  These issues are items such as “what types of wars to prepare for and under what 
conditions,” as well as “what kind of weapons the army will buy.”7  This document, though, does 
not exist in a vacuum; the national security doctrine, foreign policy concept, defense treaties, 
economic policies and constitution all provide a framework for the Russian General Staff to 
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develop the military doctrine.  Traditionally, the Russian General Staff will begin work on a new 
military doctrine once the national security doctrine is approved by the President of the Russian 
Federation.  The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 was approved 
by decree № 537 of the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev on 12 May 2009, 
thereby replacing “the country’s 1997 National Security Concept” and setting in motion 
preparations for the first new military doctrine in almost ten years.
8
 
The 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
 The 2010 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (hereinafter 2010 Doctrine) was 
approved by Presidential edict on 5 February 2010.  The document itself is divided into four 
sections: general provisions, military dangers and threats, military policy and military-economic 
support for defense.  The general provisions section—in addition to accounting for the other 
influencing documents and the legal basis for the doctrine—plainly stated the purpose of the 
2010 Doctrine, which is “for the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation 
and the interests of its allies.”9  The section also provided definitions to the formal concepts 
utilized in the doctrine, ranging from military danger, military threat and armed conflict to the 
military organization of the state and military planning.   
 In the section on military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation, the 2010 
Doctrine noted that “despite the decline in the likelihood of a large-scale war involving the use of 
conventional means of attack and nuclear weapons being unleashed against the Russian 
Federation,” there was intensification in other areas which included main external and internal 
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military dangers, as well as the main military threats.
10
  It is within the first category of main 
external military dangers that NATO was prominently mentioned, specifically its eastward 
expansion.  The 2010 Doctrine noted that NATO was a danger because of its “desire to endow” 
their force potential through “global functions carried out in violation of the norms of 
international law,” and more specifically that NATO has moved “the military infrastructure of 
NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation.”11   The category also 
noted the continued attempts at destabilization of states and regions to undermine stability, the 
deployment of foreign troops in country’s adjacent to Russia, the “creation and deployment of 
strategic missile defense systems,” as well as international terrorism in the southern border 
regions of the country.
12
  It is within this section as well that the 2010 Doctrine noted the use of 
nuclear weapons, specifically which “will remain an important factor for preventing the outbreak 
of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of conventional means of 
attack.”13    
 The third section, the military policy of the Russian Federation, provided the ‘when’ to 
use military force.  The military policy within the 2010 Doctrine is “aimed at preventing an arms 
race,” as well as “deterring and preventing military conflicts,” alluding to the more defensive 
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posture of the document.
14
  However the main task of the Russian Federation accorded by the 
military policy is the “prevention of a nuclear military conflict,” and as a result particular 
prominence in this section is given to exactitude of a nuclear deployment and the commitments 
to collective security and bilateral agreements.
15
  The 2010 Doctrine was very explicit on when 
the Russian Federation could resort to nuclear weapons, and unlike other nuclear powers, it did 
not specify a first strike option, but rather a response.  According to the 2010 Doctrine the 
Russian Federation only reserved “the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the 
utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its 
allies,” and against a conventional attack so severe that “the very existence of the state is under 
threat.”16  The 2010 Doctrine also reaffirmed the Russian Federations commitment to collective 
security organization, to include the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as to “develop relations 
in this sphere with other interstate organizations.”17   
 The agreements the Russian Federation has to the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO) are mentioned in accordance with utilization of military forces, whereby it 
noted that “an armed attack on a CSTO member state” is regarded as “aggression against all 
CSTO member states,” and will therefore “implement measures” in accordance to the treaty 
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statutes.
18
  The CSTO is furthered emphasized in regards to providing troops for peacekeeping 
operations and assigning individual units to joint rapid-response forces.  Also prominently 
mentioned throughout the section is requirement of the Russian Federation to “ensure the 
protection of its citizens located beyond the borders” of the country, both in peacetime and 
during conflict.
19
  The 2010 Doctrine also noted that in order to protect “the interests of the 
Russian Federation and its citizens” and to maintain peace and security, the Russian Armed 
Forces “may be used operationally outside the Russian Federation.”20  The remainder of the 
section covered the development of the military, organizational aspects and the development of 
military planning documents. 
 The final section on military-economic support for defense contained all the tasks for the 
“steady development and maintenance of the state’s military-economic and military-technical 
potential,” in order to meets requirements of the 2010 Doctrine both in peacetime and during 
conflict.
21
  Some of these tasks included, but were not limited to, providing modern equipment 
for the armed forces, specialized equipment for the nuclear forces and further development of the 
defense industry.  Lastly, the section covered the requirements of military-political cooperation 
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with the Republic of Belarus, SCO member states, CSTO member states, CIS member states, as 
well as the United Nations and “other international, including regional, organizations.”22     
The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 
 The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (hereinafter 2014 Doctrine) was 
approved by the President of the Russian Federation on 25 December 2014.  The document itself 
is divided into four sections: general provisions, military dangers and military threats to the 
Russian Federation, the military policy of the Russian Federation and military-economic support.  
In the interest of efficiency, and in order to reduce redundant verbiage which has previously been 
mentioned from the 2010 Doctrine, discussion on the 2014 Doctrine will focus primarily on new 
or altered sections, while still presenting the intent of the document.     
 The general provisions section begins by stating the purpose of the 2014 Doctrine is 
“preparation for armed defense and armed protection of the Russian Federation.”23  The section 
continues by acknowledging the impact of various planning documents, to include the National 
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, the Foreign Policy Concept, as well as of 
state and international laws and norms.  Specifically spelled out in the 2014 Doctrine is the 
commitment of the Russian Federation to utilize military action for “protection of national 
interests and the interests of its allies” only after “exhausting the possibilities of the use” of other 
non-violent tools.
24
  Though the section concludes by defining the basic concepts of the 2014 
Doctrine, including a military threat, military danger, local war, military policy and military 
organization. 
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 The second section on military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation 
notes that “despite a decline in the probability of unleashing against the Russian Federation a 
large-scale war” (though no differentiation of either conventional of nuclear), other military 
threats have “intensified.”25  Within the numerous lists of external military dangers there are 
several categories which have been expanded, or are new: international terrorism has grown to 
include the threat of global extremism and “its new manifestations in terms of the lack of 
effective international cooperation against terrorism,” as well as the “real threat” of nuclear and 
chemical attacks; the inclusion of “foreign private military companies in the areas adjacent to the 
state border of the Russian Federation” within armed radical groups; the use of “information and 
communication technologies in the military-political purpose” to subvert the sovereignty and 
political independence of states; the establishment in adjoining states of regimes, including those 
“as a result of the overthrow of the legitimate government bodies,” whose interests threaten 
Russia; and the “subversive activities of special services and organizations of foreign states and 
their coalitions against the Russian Federation.”26    
 The main internal military threats also saw an expansion of categories to include the 
“activities of terrorist organizations and individuals” aimed at undermining sovereignty; the 
impact of social-media activities on the population and “especially young citizens of the 
country,” with the intention of “undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the 
field of defense of the Fatherland”; the provocation of “ethnic and social tensions” and 
“extremism.”27  The characteristics and features of modern military conflicts have been 
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combined, and feature the specific mention of precision guided munitions (PGM), which are 
“comparable in efficiency with nuclear weapons,” as well as the use of “unmanned aerial 
vehicles.”28  Three new characteristics include the participation in hostilities of “irregular armed 
groups and private military companies,” the “use of indirect and asymmetric methods of action” 
and the use of “externally funded and managed” political parties and social movements.29  In 
addition, nuclear weapons remain “an important factor in preventing the emergence of nuclear 
wars and military conflicts with the use of conventional weapons.”30 
 Section three, the military policy of the Russian Federation, still maintains a defensive 
posture by aiming to deter and prevent military conflicts; the principal task is still the prevention 
of a nuclear military conflict.  The 2014 Doctrine as well maintains the “right to use nuclear 
weapons” only as a response to an attack by “nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction” and 
during a conventional attack when a “threat to the very existence of the state” exists.31  
Cooperation with various collective security organizations as a task of the Russian Federation is 
repeated, but the 2014 Doctrine includes the Republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in order to 
“ensure the common defense and security.”32  Additionally, the 2014 Doctrine now lists as a task 
the “expansion of cooperation with the states-members of the BRICS.”33  
 In order to “counter attempts by individual states (groups of states) to achieve military 
superiority through the deployment of strategic missile defense systems,” the 2014 Doctrine aims 
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to form “bilateral and multilateral cooperation in countering likely missile threats,” up to and 
including the “creation of joint missile defense systems with equal participation of Russia.”34  
The protection of Russian citizens abroad still maintains a prominent presence as a main task of 
the Armed Forces during peacetime, but what is completely new is the last task, that of “ensuring 
the national interests of the Russian Federation in the Arctic.”35  Though the category of military 
planning has been renamed as mobilization and mobilization readiness of the Russian 
Federation, the remainder of the third section—for the most part—remains relatively similar to 
the previous doctrine.  The final section on military and economic support for defense details all 
the tasks required to develop, produce and deploy equipment necessary to maintain a modern 
military force.  Lastly, the sections on tasks and priorities of military-political cooperation now 
include the Republic of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, though strangely not the BRICS, despite 
their previous inclusion in the third section on military policy. 
The Military Doctrines: A Brief Analysis 
 Both the 2010 and 2014 Doctrine, as planning instruments for military leadership, 
provide direction on what type of conflict to expect, when use of the armed forces is justified, 
and how to utilize them.  In the 2010 Doctrine, though, several major themes arose, which 
consisted of the increased danger of NATO expansion, the stance on nuclear deterrence, spheres 
of influence, commitment to collective security, and protecting the interests of Russian citizens 
abroad; as the more recent document, the 2014 Doctrine—despite a few nuanced additions—
maintained the orientation and intent of its predecessor.     
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 One of the most overarching points in the 2010 Doctrine was the inclusion of NATO as a 
main external danger, which is “still regarded as an actively hostile bloc” by Russia.36  For 
Russia, NATO was seen as “clearly an anti-Russian alliance” designed “to protect Europe from 
Russia,” and would continue to “be the main external political adversary and the main source of 
military threats to Russia.”37  Though not elevated to the status of a ‘threat’, the document did 
note specific activities “that could under certain circumstances lead to an immediate threat.”38  
The Russian Federation has been leery of any western expansion into, or influence over, any of 
the states of the former Soviet Union, but it is especially concerned with expansion which “could 
affect Russia’s security interests in the regions adjacent to its territory.”39  Even though for 
almost two decades the southern region of Russia—the North Caucasus—has been fraught with 
conflict and uncertainty, and terrorist attacks have occurred in major Russian cities, Russia’s 
“threat perception is chiefly focused on the United States and NATO.”40    
 The 2010 Doctrine, despite the mention of a decline in the possibility of a nuclear 
conflict, still maintained the option to utilize the nuclear arsenal.  This option though was 
considered as a method of deterrence, rather than an offensive stance as “Moscow recognized 
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less need for rapid recourse to nuclear measures.”41  As noted previously in the discussion of the 
2010 Doctrine, the prevention of a nuclear military conflict is designated the main task of the 
Russian Federation, and the only justification for a nuclear launch would be either in response to 
a nuclear attack, or if the ‘very existence’ of the state is in question resulting from an attack 
which utilized conventional weapons.
42
  Therefore, it was evident that “the principle of defensive 
nuclear deterrence forms the basis” of the 2010 Doctrine.43 
 Within the 2010 Doctrine as well, was Russia’s claim towards a more active role in the 
regions bordering the country; as a Russian sphere of influence; as an area where Russia would 
act to protect Russian citizens; as an area where Russia would coordination actions with other 
collective security organizations.  Though not overtly stated, the 2010 Doctrine reaffirms 
Russia’s position as the dominant power along its borders where it “would operate in defense of 
its interests without submitting its actions to international institutions for discussion or 
approval.”44  In the view of Russian officials, actions such as “attempts to destabilize the 
situation in individual states and regions” in the periphery of their border justified their more 
ominous position.
45
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 Newly added to the 2010 Doctrine was wording that Russia would act to protect their 
citizens abroad.  In fact, this is reiterated three separate times within the document: as a principal 
task of the armed forces to ensure their protection beyond the borders; as a main task of the 
armed forces to protect those outside the country; as a principal task of the armed forces to 
operate outside of the Russian Federation to protect their interests.  Lastly, the 2010 Doctrine 
clearly spelled out Russia’s commitment to collective security agreements, most prominently the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization.  Not only did Russia commit to increased collective 
security operations and to provide forces for CSTO peacekeeping and rapid-reaction forces, 
Russia also included the mutual defense provision of the CSTO.  Regardless of the overall 
defensive stance of the 2010 Doctrine this inclusion, as well as the aforementioned protection of 
citizens, reinforced Russia’s position to “act militarily in support of its allies or its citizens 
abroad.”46   
 The 2014 Doctrine, as previously mentioned, has for the most part maintained the 
orientation and themes of the previous document.  Still prominent is the expansion of NATO, 
and the immediate threat which Russia feels from it, clearly stated in the document: 
 The increasing power potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
 the allocation of its global functions implemented in violation of international law, the 
 approach of the military infrastructure of the countries – members of NATO to the 
 borders of the Russian Federation, including through further expansion of the block.
47
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However, despite this the 2014 Doctrine “will remain solely defensive.”48  The language of 
nuclear deterrence remains almost verbatim from the previous document, as well as protection of 
Russian citizens abroad and commitment to the periphery.  However, the inclusion of the Arctic 
as a region of interest is important to note as it affirms Russia’s stance towards the region, where 
they are once again pursuing an active policy “after decades of absence.”49  While the main tasks 
of the Russian Federation to prevent military conflict and for military-political cooperation did 
not change, they were expanded to include the Republic of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the BRICS 
and the Asia-Pacific region.  Their inclusion confirms Russia’s stance towards not only 
collective defense within the region, but with the addition of the BRICS, and especially the Asia-
Pacific region, it announces Russia’s intentions to play a much more influential role globally.  
Lastly, the addition and reference to foreign private military companies, irregular armed groups, 
subversive groups and externally funded social movements represent Russia’s real belief that 
these groups are being utilized in areas near their border, in order to undermine their influence 
and position in the region.       
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CHAPTER 2 
THE 2008 RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN WAR 
 
The conflict might be thought of as the final war of the twentieth century, fought by a Soviet 
legacy force, desperately seeking to make do with dated equipment and a top-heavy command 
and control system more suited to conducting the kind of large-scale conventional warfare that 
had passed into the annals of military history. 
—Roger N. McDermott, Russ  ’s C  v  t    l Arm d   rc s   d th  G  rg    W r 
 
 
 
 The 2008 Russian-Georgian war, which took place 7-12 of August 2008, began in the 
territory of the Republic of South Ossetia, but eventually expanded to include the Republic of 
Abkhazia, as well as the northern regions of Georgia.  Though the armed conflict only lasted a 
mere five days, tensions between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia had 
steadily deteriorated for many months prior.  The conflict featured large movements of armored 
columns with tanks and armored personnel carriers, the limited-use of airpower by the Russian 
forces, amphibious landings by Russian forces into Abkhazia, and a minor naval engagement 
between Russian and Georgian ships in the Black Sea.  While ending in a Russian victory, the 
war served to highlight not only the poor condition of their equipment, but also the need for more 
advanced weapons platforms and capabilities akin to the adversaries in the Georgian military.  In 
this chapter, I will offer an account of the conflict that demonstrates Russian military 
deficiencies, and then turn to the lessons military planners drew from the experience. 
Prelude to War 
 Tensions between Russia and Georgia over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
had been, for the most part, relatively low since the dual conflicts in those regions in the early 
1990s.  However, a series of events in the spring and summer of 2008 “strongly suggested that 
29 
 
 
confrontation in the Georgian conflict zones was becoming increasingly likely.”50  Earlier in the 
year the situation had been looking optimistic, when Russian President Vladimir Putin and 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili met in February to “discuss the re-establishment of trade 
and air traffic links that had been cut in 2006.”51  This event notwithstanding, on 4 March 2008 
Georgia withdrew from the Joint Control Commission (JCC) in South Ossetia, which in turned 
caused “a setback in the Tbilisi-Moscow dialogue.”52  The response from Moscow to this was 
swift and deliberate.   
 On 6 March 2008 Russia declared that it would lift previous trade restrictions on the 
Republic of Abkhazia and urged “other CIS countries to follow suit,” followed shortly 
afterwards in April by a presidential decree signed by President Putin which instructed “Russian 
state agencies to establish official ties with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto 
administrations.”53  After the deployment of Russian Railway Troops to Abkhazia in May, 
Russia began a large military exercise in July, Kavkaz 20008, which took place in “eleven 
regions near the Georgian-Russian border” and involved about 8,000 troops.54  By the beginning 
of August, incidents in South Ossetia elevated it to prominence as the center of tension.  The 
month began with a Georgian military vehicle explosion, which Georgia blamed on South 
Ossetia.  The next day, South Ossetia claimed that Georgian snipers had killed several of their 
soldiers, followed directly by a retaliatory mortar attack on several Georgian villages, killing a 
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Georgian police officer and several others.
55
  Over the next several days, military confrontation 
between Georgian and South Ossetian forces increased.  On 7 August, the South Ossetian capital 
of Tskhinvali was shelled, and Georgian forces were sent “into the disputed region to seize 
control of it.”56  A last ditch effort to avert a larger conflict was made the same day by 
representatives of the Georgian government, who traveled to Tskhinvali in order to meet with 
South Ossetian officials.  However, the meeting never occurred, and later that evening “the first 
media reports of troop movements through the Roki tunnel from [Russian] North Ossetia” began 
to appear.
57
  With this, the Russian movement of forces into South Ossetia from North Ossetia, 
and the start of the war, had begun. 
The Ground Campaign 
 The movement of Georgian troops into South Ossetia on 7 August 2008 had two main 
objectives: the first was to quickly overwhelm and destroy the smaller South Ossetian forces and 
“occupy the capital of Tskhinvali”; the second objective was to block the Transcaucasian 
highway and the Roki tunnel, in order to “prevent the arrival of volunteers from Russia.”58  
However, the Achilles heel of the Georgian operation was that “it completely overlooked the 
                                                 
55
 Popjanevski, From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali, 149.  Following the mortar attacks, the commander of the Russian 
Airborne Troops announced Russia’s readiness to assist Russian members of the JCC in South Ossetia. 
 
56
 Gregory P. Lannon, “Russia’s New Look Army Reforms and Russian Foreign Policy,” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 24, no. 1 (2011), 34.  See also Ilai Z. Saltzman, “Russian Grand Strategy and the United States in 
the 21
st
 Century,” Orbis 56, no. 4 (2012), 558, where he noted that even though skirmishes had occurred between 
Georgia and South Ossetia for several months prior, it was the decision to move the Georgian military into South 
Ossetia “that turned a relatively low-intensity protracted skirmish into a large-scale conflict.” 
 
57
 Ibid., 151.  The first media reports began around 7:10pm local time. 
58
 Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, and Vi acheslav T Selu ko, T     Avgust : Sb r    St t   (Moskva: T Sentr 
analiza strategi  i tekhnologi , 2009), 49. 
 
31 
 
 
possibility of the Russian army’s intervention in the conflict.”59   Unknown to the Georgian 
military leadership at the time, a Russian infantry battalion and weaponry had already deployed 
south of the Roki tunnel and “reinforcements were camped north of the tunnel.”60  Continuing on 
with their original plan, the Georgian forces on 8August 2008 initiated their attack against the 
capital city of Tskhinvali, as well as surrounding positions overlooking the city, with a large 
artillery bombardment, followed shortly thereafter by the movement of the ground forces.  The 
attack into Tskhinvali by the larger Georgian force “made it significantly harder for the Russian 
ground troops to enter Georgian-controlled territory.”61  
 On the morning of 8 August 2008 the first contingents of Russian aircraft began to appear 
in the skies over the city, and began attacks on the advancing Georgian forces.  By this time, the 
main body of the Russian 58
th
 Army had moved through the tunnel, and “launched a heavy 
counterattack in South Ossetia” towards the capital.62  The Russian 58th Army, which had 
participated in the recent Kavkaz exercise, was part of the North Caucasus Military District and 
were considered some of “Russia’s most competent troops” because of their extensive combat 
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experience in Chechnya and the Caucasus, with a larger complement of professional soldiers.
63
  
The remainder of the Russian armored and mechanized forces consisted of the 19
th
 Motor Rifle 
Division, the 42
nd
 Motor Rifle Division and the 33
rd
 Special Mountain Brigade as well as the 
airborne forces of the 76
th
 Guards Airborne Division, the 98
th
 Airborne Division and the 45
th
 
Airborne Special Forces Regiment, in addition to the pro-Russian Chechen GRU Vostok and 
Zapad battalions.
64
 
 The following day, 9 August 2008, Russian launched operations in Abkhazia, conducting 
both a large amphibious invasion and delivering ground forces into the region by rail, deploying 
around 9,000 troops.
65
  The same day Georgian forces had advanced further into Tskhinvali, and 
amid fierce fighting by both sides, managed to capture the southern portions of the city.  As a 
testament to how fierce the fighting was, the commander of the 58
th
 Army General Anatoly 
Khrulev “was wounded during hand-to-hand fighting” which occurred after his column was 
ambushed outside of the city by Georgian forces.
66
  Regardless of Georgian will, by 10 August 
2008 Georgian forces had been pushed out of Tskhinvali as they were “increasingly 
                                                 
63
 Barabanov, Lavrov, and T Selu ko, Tanki Avgusta, 46-47.  This is important to note, as the forces sent to confront 
the Georgian military advance were not the same conscript heavy force that attempted to capture Grozny in 1994; 
however, the Russian forces still contained a large portion of conscripts, and although they were a much better force 
than in 1994, they still were not comparable to most Western military forces at the time. 
 
64
 Felgenhauer, After August 7, 166-167.  The author also noted on page 73, the troop strength of this force at 25-
30,000 soldiers, who were supported by 1,200 pieces of armor and heavy artillery, and an additional 10-15,000 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatist fighters, which served as an auxiliary force.  Barabanov, Lavrov, and 
T Selu ko, Tanki Avgusta, 47, noted the antiquated composition of much of the equipment utilized by the Russian 
forces.  For example, the 42
nd
 Motorized Rifle Division was equipped with T-62 tanks, which at the time were more 
than 40 years old.  The T-72 tank, which replaced the T-62, was deployed in small numbers and spread throughout 
several tank units, and no tank units had the T-80 or newer T-90.  The motorized infantry suffered as well.  
Although there were a good percentage of the BMP-2 and BTR-80 personnel carriers in action, the majority were 
the much older BMP-1 and MTLB.   
   
65
 Popjanevski, From Sukhumi to Tskhinvali, 152.  See also Felgenhauer, After August 7, 171, who noted that earlier 
Georgia had received intelligence that Russia was massing forces for an invasion of Abkhazia.  In addition, hours 
before the invasion Moscow had sent a diplomatic cable to Georgia declaring a ‘state of siege’ in the region of 
Abkhazia. 
 
66
 Felgenhauer, After August 7, 170. 
 
33 
 
 
overpowered and outgunned” by the overwhelming number of Russian forces that had been 
deployed to South Ossetia.
67
  After taking control of Tskhinvali, the Russian forces in South 
Ossetia crossed the border into Georgia, while the Georgian forces conducted a fighting 
withdrawal.   
 In the region of Abkhazia, Russian forces met little resistance.  By 10 August 2008, 
Russian forces occupied the Georgian naval base at Poti, and then the large Georgian military 
base at Senaki the following day, where they “captured large stockpiles of Georgian military 
equipment” and proceeded to destroy the facilities.68  On 11 August 2008, a general retreat began 
on all fronts, as the Georgian forces withdrew towards Tbilisi and began “concentrating forces 
for a last stand to defend the capital.”69   However, that battle never happened, as on 12 August 
2008, Russian forces in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Georgia ceased all operations by order of 
the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev. 
End State: A Brief Analysis 
 The rapid victory by Russian forces during the war with Georgia in 2008 came as a shock 
to most Western observers, since it “stood in stark contrast to the manner in which Russian 
forces had once become bogged down in a protracted conflict in Chechnya.”70  The five-day war 
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featured the Russian use of overwhelming mechanized forces, which utilized Soviet-style tactics, 
while the smaller Georgian forces, who fielded upgraded and modernized equipment, employed 
more mobile tactical units and support-by-fire techniques.  The war can also be viewed as the 
first time Russia took an active stand against possible NATO expansion into a region on their 
periphery.   
 Strategically, Russian forces had the upper hand as the military command had 
successfully planned for the war by staging large contingents of the 58
th
 Army throughout North 
Ossetia and Southern Russia at the conclusion of the Kavkaz 2008 exercises.  Russia took 
advantage of this operationally by “committing a significantly greater number of forces to the 
fight” much more rapidly than Georgia could.71  It was these strategic and operational 
advantages which meant that eventual victory “did not depend on any great degree on Russian 
tactical skills.”72  The Russian armored and mechanized forces throughout the conflict typically 
utilized traditional Soviet-style tactics, which consisted of “moving in column formation, 
fighting from the lead elements and continuing to press forward after making contact,” which 
regardless provided advantages in the speed and simplicity of operation.
73
   
                                                                                                                                                             
something that the General Staff had planned for.  He equated the Russian victory to the overwhelming Russian 
force, the large number of kontraktniky, and the experience of the 58
th
 Army, who had an abundance of experience 
from constant combat in Chechnya. 
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 The Georgian forces, though lacking strategic or operational advantages, did have an 
advantage in the tactical arena.  In order to participate in NATO operations, the Georgian army 
was required to reorganize into a “small professional force, highly mobile, and relatively lightly 
armed,” in order to meet NATO standards.74  This training, which was conducted by U.S. and 
Western military advisors to prepare Georgian forces for deployments to Kosovo and Iraq, taught 
their ground forces “skills relevant to conventional engagements at the tactical level” such as 
“reacting to contact and using firepower to support maneuver against the enemy.”75  It was these 
newly acquired skills which enabled Georgian forces to initially gain a substantial foothold on 
Tskhinvali and continue to harass Russian forces even as they conducted a tactical withdraw.  
Despite a greater tactical advantage, the eventual collapse of the Georgian forces was the result 
of overall “Georgian military weakness, poor management, and limited combat capabilities” due 
to a smaller military, rather than “anything accurately reflecting the prowess of Russia’s armed 
forces.”76 
 During the conflict, the geography of the battlefield proved an obstacle to the Russian 
forces.  The only way in or out of South Ossetia was the Transcaucasian highway via the Roki 
tunnel, and it was a critical route for Russia to bring forward reinforcements and supplies and to 
remove wounded personnel and damaged equipment.  However, much of this was constricted 
due to the floods of civilian refugees, and “old Russian tanks and armored vehicles” which 
“often broke down,” thereby causing “constant traffic jams south of the Roki tunnel.”77  The 
older—and in some cases obsolete—equipment that most of the Russian ground forces were 
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equipped with during the war was an concern that became painfully obvious over the course the 
five days.   
 The Russian ground forces during the war, for the most part, had a rather lackluster 
showing.  Although there overwhelming force was conducive to a quick advance, they “were 
slow to react” to changes in battlefield tempo and “ponderous once they did react.”78   Also, as a 
result of the “uneven quality of the motorized rifle units committed to the fight,” the brunt of the 
fighting was bore by the Airborne and Special Forces units.
79
   Communication—or rather lack 
thereof—was a major issue that plagued Russian commanders of all levels.  Antiquated 
communication gear resulted in an “almost total breakdown of military communication systems” 
during the conflict, and as a result Russian commanders were forced to utilize their own cell 
phones to communicate with each other and their troops.
80
  Out-dated communications systems 
were not the only equipment issue the Russian ground forces had to contend with.   In addition to 
the previously mentioned poorly-maintained and obsolete tanks and armored vehicles, Russian 
ground forces lacked essentials for modern combat: night-vision equipment (both vehicle 
mounted and smaller units for individual soldiers); identify friend or foe (IFF) systems, either in 
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the form of vehicle panels or flags; satellite navigation systems; and aerial reconnaissance 
means, either through UAV’s or satellites.81  
 Georgian forces on the other hand—due in no small part to their joint activities with 
Western military forces—had more advanced and modernized weapons, even though the 
majority of their weapons systems consisted of Soviet-era equipment.  As a result, the “Georgian 
forces seem to have inflicted more damage than they suffered.”82  A majority of Georgian tanks 
and armored personnel carriers were equipped with “reactive armor, night vision equipment, 
advanced radios, and superior fire control systems” that had been installed by an Israeli 
contractor—all items sorely lacking on their Russian counterparts.83  Georgian tanks in particular 
were much superior to their Russian adversaries.  The Georgian armored forces were equipped 
with Russian-manufactured T-72s, but in addition to the aforementioned upgrades, they also had 
separate infrared cameras for both the driver and commander, GPS navigation, and the ability to 
fire Ukrainian-installed ‘Kombat’ guided tank-launched missiles, which as a result made them 
“superior to the tanks of Georgia’s former autonomies…as well as to any tanks Russia’s North 
Caucasus military district could deploy in 2008.”84 
 Lastly, the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 may also be viewed as 
Russia’s line in the sand against NATO expansion, and a reaffirmation of the Russian sphere of 
influence.  Not only did it send a strong signal that “Russia intends to play a much more assertive 
role in international affairs in general and in the regional settings in particular,” the war also 
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made it known that “attempts to recruit former Soviet Republics” into Western organizations 
such as NATO “was not something that Moscow approved.”85  In the end, regardless of 
modernized equipment or Western training, the conflict became a numbers game—and the 
Georgian forces just could not hold back the overwhelming mass of the Russian military 
machine.   
The Impetus for Change 
 The Russian army which went into action in Georgia in August 2008 appeared “highly 
reminiscent of the Red Army,” rather than a 21st century military force.86  From their methods of 
tactical operation to the composition and equipment of their ground forces, elements of their 
Soviet past were readily apparent.  Despite their overwhelming numbers and quick victory, the 
Russian conventional forces utilized during the war were deemed “technically and 
technologically inferior” to their Georgian counterparts.87 
 The war highlighted more than anything else, the old and outdated military equipment— 
particularly armored vehicles — of the Russian ground forces.  During the offensive into South 
                                                 
85
 Ilai Z. Saltzman, “Russian Grand Strategy and the United States in the 21st Century,” Orbis 56, no. 4 (2012), 559-
560.  See also Felgenhauer, After August 7, 177, who gave another perspective on this theory.  He noted that “the 
main task of the Russian invasion was to bring about state failure and fully destroy the Georgian army and 
centralized police force,” as a failed Georgian state could never become a NATO member and “could be easier to 
control from Moscow.”  See also Cohen and Hamilton, The Russian Military and the Georgia War, 71, who 
concurred as well and expanded the discussion by noting that the war was “intricately linked with Russia’s demands 
to revise European security architecture, do away with NATO, and weaken U.S. security presence in, and ties with, 
Europe.” 
 
86
 Margarete Klein, “Towards a ‘New Look’ of the Russian Armed Forces?” in The Russian Armed Forces in 
Transition: Economic, Geopolitical and Institutional Uncertainties, ed. Roger N. McDermott, Bertil Nygren and 
Carolina Vendil Pallin (New York: Routledge, 2012), 29.  See also Cohen and Hamilton, The Russian Military and 
the Georgian War, 31, where they noted that the Georgian Army had “jettisoned Soviet doctrine and purged the vast 
majority of the Soviet-era leadership.”  The result of this was a double-edged sword though, as though it did allow 
the introduction of Western-style military theory and operational concepts, this rush to ‘modernize’ removed a 
majority of the senior leadership with not only actual operational command experience, but familiarity with the 
Russian (Soviet) methods of warfare. 
 
87
 Thornton, A Bear With Teeth, 52.  See also Galeotti, Reform of the Russian Military, 62, and Roger N. 
McDermott, “The Restructuring of the Modern Russian Army,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22 (2009), 493, 
who both noted shortcomings in both equipment and tactics. 
 
39 
 
 
Ossetia and Georgia more than 50 percent of the Russian tanks and armored vehicles suffered 
major breakdowns which removed them from operation.
88
  In addition to maintenance problems, 
the armor of the T-62 and early model T-72 tanks which formed the core of the Russian ground 
forces proved highly susceptible to Georgian anti-tank systems.
89
  Although some of the newer 
T-72 tanks were equipped with reactive armor canisters, most of them were empty, “effectively 
rendering them useless.”90     
 Not only were the tanks and armored vehicles outdated, but the personal-issue gear of the 
individual Russian soldier was lacking as well.  The Russian soldiers went into battle with a 
helmet that had not changed in design since their grandfathers repelled the last great German 
offensive at Kursk in July 1943.  Body armor—a major component of any modern infantry 
force—was sorely lacking as well.  During the war, it was common occurrence for Russian 
soldiers to strip the “helmets and body armor from dead Georgians in order to improve their 
personal protection.”91  Command and control systems proved insufficient for the requirements 
of modern conflict; many of the radio systems were woefully obsolete, and in one extreme case 
the commander of the 58
th
 Army were forced to borrow a satellite phone from a reporter during 
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the middle of a firefight for lack of any other form of communications between units.
92
  The war 
also revealed the essentials of modern combat which the Russian ground forces lacked, most 
prominently thermal imaging, night vision goggles, satellite navigation, aerial reconnaissance 
and precision guided munitions.   
 The condition of equipment and weapons “had long been a source of discontent within 
the military,” and the war with Georgia proved to be the final straw.93  Only a few months after 
the conclusion of the conflict, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced the beginning of a 
radical transformation of the Russian armed forces, the scope of which had not been attempted 
before, and that once completed would remove “all vestiges of its former Soviet structure.”94 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE 2008 ‘NEW LOOK’ MILITARY REFORMS 
 
The armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 lit the fuse for the long overdue 
creation of a distinct form for the Russian military, as opposed to a continuous existence as a 
pale remnant of the Soviet armed forces. 
—Keir Giles, Russian Operations in Georgia 
 
 
 
 Since the establishment of the current Russian Armed Forces in 1992, both military and 
civilian leaders had flirted with the idea of military reform, though prior to 2008, no one had 
made a firm commitment.  During the midst of the First Chechen War, Defense Minister Pavel 
Grachev with the support of President Boris Yeltsin, announced intentions to create smaller, and 
more mobile forces, as well as to reduce the overall size of the military.  In 1997, Defense 
Minister Igor Sergeev initiated some basic reforms, such as creating more fully-manned units 
and restructuring the military educational system.
95
  The most ambitious plan to date was 
announced by President Vladimir Putin during his first term, who wanted to reduce the number 
of conscript soldiers, while at the same time increasing the number of kontraktniki (professional 
contract troops) with the ultimate goal of a 100 percent contract force.  Though these previous 
attempts did reduce the overall size of the military, what remained though was basically a 
“scaled-down version of a Soviet-style mass conscription army.”96   
 With the conclusion of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War, the need for drastic change—
both in terms of structure and equipment—was readily apparent.  Though reform had been a 
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recent topic of discussion, it was this conflict which enabled Defense Minister Anatoly 
Serdyukov to garner support “from a group of generals, now at the top of the armed forces, with 
combat experience and a determination to bring about change.”97  The reforms, which consisted 
of five areas of focus—readiness, structure, equipment, military education, quality of life—were 
to be the impetus of a new, more modern and professional 21
st
 century Russian military force.   
By 2012, most of the core reforms had occurred, and though the process had involved 
compromises from the original concept, the Russian military that emerged on the other side 
stood in stark contrast to its former shadow. 
Objectives of the ‘New Look’ Reforms 
 On 14 October 2008, Defense Minister Serdyukov officially announced the plans for the 
‘New Look’ military reforms.98  The goal of these reforms was to “create a professional, 
permanent combat-ready force,” with all formations of the Russian army to “be fully manned” 
and in a permanent-readiness status by 2012.
99
  Shortly afterwards, President Dmitry Medvedev 
announced five main areas of focus for the reforms: increased combat readiness in the form of a 
permanent-readiness status for all units; restructuring and personnel reductions; modernization of 
weapons and equipment; improvements in military education; improvements in quality of life for 
service members.
100
  In short order the reforms aimed to remove the old Soviet-style mass-
mobilization army, and in their place a smaller, yet more efficient, and deployable fighting force.  
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 Beyond the recognized need to reform after the Russian-Georgian war, the reforms also 
reflected the realization of “the new nature of conflicts Russia may have to face,” which will 
primarily be “local conflicts, mostly on the territory of the former Soviet Union,” and as such 
these types of conflicts require a “strong rapid-reaction armed force that can be permanently 
maintained in a combat-ready state.”101  Due to the nature of these threats emanating from the 
periphery, the ‘New Look’ reforms for the most part focused on the conventional forces, and 
specifically the ground forces.
102
     
Mass-Mobilization to Professional Force (Permanent-Readiness, part I) 
 Under the mass-mobilization model, only a small percentage of units were manned at full 
capacity.  The remainder was cadre units, which consisted of a skeleton force of officers at each 
unit who, in time of a national mobilization, were there to provide the initial training to the 
thousands of conscripts from all over the country.  As the permanent-readiness concept required 
units to be fully staffed, the cadre units were no longer a logical part of this new force.  
Throughout Russia, the cadre units were dismembered, with the equipment that had been stored 
at central depots relocated to their respective units.   
 A ‘New Look’ military also required a better-trained force, which could not only 
competently operate the modern and technologically advanced equipment the permanent-
readiness force required, but who were also trained in the tactical concepts of new low-intensity 
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regional conflicts.
103
  In the eyes of the Kremlin, these training and execution goals could only be 
realized “by expanding the percentage of contract (kontraktniki) soldiers in the armed forces.”104  
A long-standing policy of the Russian armed forces was to only use kontraktniki in combat 
operations outside Russia, mainly because of the horrible military and public relations nightmare 
that arose during the First Chechen War.
105
  The kontraktniki also fit better into the permanent-
readiness model since “adequate training demands far more time” than the standard conscript 
one year term of service.
106
  The fact of the matter as well is that the use of kontraktniki troops in 
the permanent-readiness force makes the use of military force more palatable, as the “wider 
public tends to have a more permissive view of professional soldiers’ deaths than those of 
conscripts.”107       
From Divisions to Brigades (Permanent-Readiness, part II) 
 The standard organizational structure of the Russian army followed the previous Soviet-
model of military district, army, division and regiment.  This structure though, especially the 
division, proved “inflexible in responding to the requirements of a short, mid-intensity war,” 
which had occurred in Russia’s southern periphery.108  The division was designed to fight a 
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large-scale land war of earlier eras, operating across an extended frontline, which in turn made 
the division ill-suited for modern operational demands.
109
  The divisions were also very top 
heavy.  While each of the three regiments contained the traditional mix of armor and infantry, 
organic assets, such as artillery, were held at the division level and released to a regiment when 
required; while this composition does not have the “adroitness or flexibility to cope with the 
demands of fast-moving modern conflict,” it was perfectly suited to “all-out conventional 
warfare” of the type envisaged against NATO.110   
 In order to provide a structure more suited to a permanent-readiness force, the division 
was replaced by the brigade.
111
  The brigade, which is a standard formation of most Western 
militaries, provided a more adaptable platform conducive to regional conflicts.
112
  The brigade is 
composed of around 4,000 soldiers, with the previous assets held at division contained 
organically, thereby allowing “for a more rapid deployment to the theatre and more mobility 
within the theatre.”113  These new brigades were to form part of a “three-tier command system,” 
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which comprised the military district/joint strategic command, operational command, and the 
actual brigade.
114
  The operational command, which replaced the army group, provided for a 
more joint command structure as each will have operational control over “all the forces in its 
area of responsibility, including aviation, air defense, missile units, etc.”115  Further flexibility 
was also gained by assigning battalions to the brigades, rather than their previous position 
underneath divisions, as this allowed for greater “tactical flexibility and responsiveness of these 
subunits.”116  This structure also reduced the previous redundancy for the utilization of non-
organic assets, thereby increasing tactical command and control.
117
  With this new structure, the 
Russian ground forces had a smaller and more responsive force, with the required support assets 
to meet mission requirements, as well as the ability to modify based on operational and tactical 
conditions.  
 The ‘New Look’ force also meant a much slimmer force.  The mass-mobilization model 
Russian army after the war in Georgia consisted of over a million soldiers and 355,000 officers, 
as well as 140,000 warrant officers, which equated to “one officer for every 2.5 soldiers,” a 
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greater ratio than any other military force in the world.
118
  With the disbanding of the cadre units, 
in addition to the creation of the smaller brigade structure, the ‘New Look’ reforms by design 
required personnel reductions; the officer corps was to be reduced by roughly 200,000 (including 
over 200 generals) and the warrant officer position to be eliminated.  The most prolific cuts were 
to occur within the field grade officers: colonels from 25,665 to 9,114; lieutenant-colonel from 
88,678 to 15,000; majors from 99,550 to 25,000; and company grade officers (captain) from 
90,000 to 40,000.
119
  The junior officer corps will be increased, however, as they are “essential to 
anchor new thinking within the military,” as well as vital to “improve the training of soldiers.”120      
 In addition to a decreased officer corps, the reforms also initiated a level of leadership 
never previously seen in the Russian military—that of a non-commissioned officer corps, better 
known in Western armies as an NCO.  The creation of a NCO corps was in line with the desire to 
‘professionalize’ the military, as an NCO holds the rank of sergeant or above, thereby requiring a 
contract soldier who will serve for several years.  The NCO corps will hold mid-level leadership 
positions in the military, which is “crucial for the maintenance of discipline and for training.”121  
Previously, the Russian army relied solely on junior officers for all training, as well as any tasks 
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“which required even the most basic degree of thought.”122  This new NCO corps will not only 
execute “many of the functions previously afforded to officers,” but will also form the 
foundation of the permanent-readiness force.
123
   
Modern Weapons and Equipment (Permanent-Readiness, part III) 
 A key element to the ‘New Look’ reforms were new, or at least modernized, weapons 
and equipment, as the permanent-readiness forces could no longer rely on Soviet ‘legacy’ 
weapons.  New and cutting-edge weapons and technology were “central to the future success” 
and long-term viability of the Russian armed forces.
124
  Within the larger category of modernized 
weapons and equipment, there were four main areas of focus: the creation of multirole weapon 
systems; advance precision-guided munitions (PGM); to greatly improve communication 
systems; upgrade command, control and communications systems at strategic, operational and 
tactical levels.
125
  Besides new technology, the reforms addressed some of the more basic 
equipment vital to a permanent-readiness force, such as new uniforms and personal equipment, 
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and night-vision equipment in both vehicles and for individual wear.
126
   Many of the previous 
Soviet ‘legacy’ systems in use were to be reduced, or even eliminated, which would not only 
allow for the acquisition of new equipment, but also streamline a much burdened logistical 
system.
127
   
Military Education and Quality of Life (Permanent-Readiness, part IV) 
 The military education system in Russia, which provided both entry-level and advance 
education for officers, was also destined to be reformed.  The military education system 
consisted of 65 institutions spread across Russia, and annually trained around 18,000 officers.
128
  
However, with the reforms, new officers would be “compelled to harness and refine their skills 
at one of 10 academic military training centers.”129  While the initial objective was only 10 
institutions, the reform guidelines were expanded to 16, which included three military training 
and science centers for “officer training for each branch of the armed forces,” as well as 11 
military academies and 2 military universities.
130
  The simple logic behind this change was the 
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personnel reductions in the officer corps, as a smaller officer corps no longer warranted such a 
vast training and education system. 
 The final major goal of the reforms was to increase the quality of life for servicemen.  
While during the Soviet period the army was a well-paying and viable career option, especially 
for officers, servicemen in the Russian army were faced with “low salaries, declining prestige 
and bullying,” which in turn made it an “unpopular employer.”131  The major factor was pay, as a 
private made $260-300 per month based on military posting, and a lieutenant made $522-530 per 
month, also dependent on posting.
132
  The financial aspect of service had become so bad, that 
after the reforms were announced President Medvedev stated “one should not have to be 
ashamed of serving for pay like this.”133  The reforms initiated a pay increase for all service 
members, which in some cases doubled their pay, as well as better housing, benefits packages 
and social services.
134
   
The Dilemma and Reality of Reform by 2012/2013 
 The initial actions of the ‘New Look’ reforms began with personnel reductions in the 
officer corps, and as well as the associated structural changes involved with the brigade system 
of permanent-readiness.  The modernization of equipment followed shortly afterwards, and with 
it came changes in the acquisition process for new equipment.  In November 2012, Defense 
Minister Serdyukov and Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov were replaced by Sergei 
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Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov respectively.  Despite this change in leadership the “basis of the 
overhauled Armed Forces never changed,” and the new Defense Minister “continued to lead the 
Armed Forces along the charted course.”135  By 2013, analysts concluded that the reform process 
was “proving flexible and…developing with impressive speed.”136  This marked progress though 
required variation and compromise from the force originally envisioned in 2008. 
 While the intent of the reforms was to create a permanent-readiness force manned by 
kontraktniki soldiers, by 2010 the Russian military realized that “due to the demographic decline 
and a generally low attractiveness of military service,” they were going to have to reverse course 
and start increasing conscription.
137
  In addition Defense Minister Serdyukov noted: 
  We have no money to maintain contract servicemen in the quantities in which we would 
 like to have them and that is why reduction of the quantity of contract servicemen and 
 increase of the quantity of conscript servicemen is going on.
138
  
 
This sudden change in direction produced immediate issues for the creation of permanent-
readiness forces.  The most glaring issue was the predicament of “mixed manning units” of both 
kontraktniki and conscripts, as these one-year term conscripts were constantly in various stages 
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of training and skill-level dependent on whether they had entered in the summer or winter 
induction cycle.
139
  By 2012, as a result of the reduction of kontraktniki, and the increase of one-
year term conscripts, the permanent-readiness brigades are “nowhere near fully manned or 
appropriately trained.”140 
 The structure of the military also evolved from the original announcement in 2008.  The 
most glaring change was the reduction of the military district/joint strategic command from the 
old Soviet districts, to four regional districts: western, southern, central, and eastern.
141
  The 
brigade restructuring continued to press forward throughout this process, and by early 2009 23 
divisions were disbanded and regrouped into 40 new brigades, thereby creating the combined-
arms permanent-readiness units of four tank brigades, 35 motorized rifle brigades and one 
combat, service and support brigade.
142
  The remainder 45 brigades were formed by December 
2009, and consisted of missile, artillery, MLRS, engineers, communications and other various 
combat support elements.
143
  After the Vostok 2011 exercises, the decision was made to further 
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sub-divide the combined-arms brigades.  The result was a threat-specific tailorable force 
consisting of heavy brigades with mainly tanks, medium brigades equipped with tracked armored 
personnel carriers, and light brigades with wheeled armored personnel carriers.
144
  Each type of 
brigade will have a specific role: the heavy brigade will be the core ground unit and “maintain 
permanent combat readiness status”; the medium brigade is designed for rapid-response units; 
and the light brigade are the most highly mobile.
145
  As a result of the expansion of the brigades, 
by January 2012 the number of brigades of all types had reached 96.
146
   
 Organizational command structure also changed, when in December 2012 President Putin 
subordinated “the General Staff directly to the President as Commander-in-Chief,” who had 
previously reported to the Minister of Defense.
147
  A major initiative of the reforms, the NCO 
corps, began official training of 1 December 2009, when the NCO training academy for the 
Airborne forces accepted its first class of 254 trainees for the ten month program at the Ryazan 
Airborne Institute.  The first class graduated in June 2012 from the over two-year program, and 
though it began with 254 trainees, the final total was 180 graduates; a second class of 175 
graduated in November 2012; and 124 were expected to finish in early 2013.
148
   These small 
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classes underscored “the problem facing the Russian MoD in attracting, training and retaining a 
new generation of junior commanders.”149  Though the importance of an NCO corps was 
stressed in the reforms, based off of graduation numbers, the emphasis to complete this task does 
not seem to be a priority.     
 Lastly, the modernization process of weapons and equipment, though getting off to a 
slow start, had begun in earnest by 2011.  The process was spurred by the creation in 2011 of the 
State Armament Program 2011-2020 (G sud rstv        Pr gr mm     ru h      a 2011-
2020), which increased military spending for the Ministry of Defense to 19 trillion rubles, with at 
least “10 percent of the GPV financing…channeled into R&D, 80 percent into new weapons, and 
the remaining 10 percent into repair and upgrades of existing equipment.”150  This has resulted in 
the disposal of older model T-55 and T-64 tanks, as well as early model T-80 tanks, and their 
replacement by upgraded T-72B/BM/BA and T-90 tanks, as well as new armored personnel 
carriers in the form of the BMP-3 and MTLB 6MA.
151
  The surge to re-equip the permanent-
readiness forces with modernized, or preferably new equipment, also brought into question the 
ability of the Russian defense industry “to deliver on such massive contracts,” as much of the 
new designs will “be based on completely new designs” instead of newer evolutions of old 
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Soviet legacy platforms.
152
  However this status may be, in 2013 the Ministry of Defense 
committed to increase the level of modern weapons and equipment to 30 percent by 2015, and to 
70-80 percent by 2020.
153
  Due to the ambitious nature of the 2008 ‘New Look’ military reforms, 
there will be some goals which will have to be adjusted and compromised, and some that will not 
be met at all.  Regardless of that fact, the Russian military force that has evolved is one much 
different from just a few years earlier in Georgia; it is also a force that experts consider to be 
“more effective, flexible, adaptable and scalable for achieving Russia’s foreign policy aims.”154  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE 2014-2015 ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN 
UKRAINE 
 
A reformed military, after all, is meant to be a more usable one. 
—Mark Galeotti, Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus 
 
A genuine rebirth of Russia as a great power is impossible without the restoration of Russian 
predominance in the former Soviet republics. 
—Mikhail Barabanov, Towards a Military Doctrine for Russia 
 
 
 
 The 2014 invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as 
well as their ongoing support of the breakaway regions of the Donetsk Peoples Republic and 
Lugansk Peoples Republic, have not only inflamed tensions between Russia and the West, but 
also reintroduced uncertainty to the region of Eastern Europe.  Though the Crimean referendum 
for incorporation into the Russian Federation became official in March 2014, and for the moment 
the criterion of the Minsk Protocol has halted the fighting in eastern Ukraine, the eventual 
outcome is still up for debate.  Regardless, the use of a modernized and professional force of 
airborne troops and Spetsnaz, supported by recently re-structured conventional forces at the 
Russian border, announced clearly the arrival of the new Russian military.  The crisis has also 
served to aggrandize Russia’s posture towards Western intrusion—specifically NATO—in their 
periphery.     
Prelude to the Occupation 
 The peninsula of Crimea was an important region for the former Soviet Union, and has 
been critical for both Ukraine and Russia, mainly because of the strategic naval port of 
Sevastopol.  Due to its deep-water ports, and access to the Mediterranean, Sevastopol’s location 
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“enhances its strategic interest for regional and foreign actors.”155  After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and the creation of an independent Ukraine, the loss of a major part of portion of 
coastline became an “additional source of geopolitical frustration for Russia,” who saw their 
access to the Black Sea “cut down from the whole northern shore” to a “short portion of the 
Caucasian coasts.”156  Ownership of the naval base at Sevastopol was a contentious issue until 
1997, when Russia and Ukraine agreed to joint-use of the base until 2017, and split the fleet 
between the two countries.  The lease was renewed with the Kharkov Accords in 2010, 
extending Russia use until 2042.
157
  However, this all came into question with events that 
unfolded in Kiev in the fall of 2013.   
 In 2012, Ukraine began work towards an association agreement with the European 
Union, in order to revitalize their struggling economy.  In order to be eligible, Ukraine was 
required to make governance and economic changes.  However, the Ukrainian government 
instead signed a partnership agreement with the Russian Federation in December 2013, which 
sparked a series of demonstrations and riots in the capital city of Kiev.  These riots intensified, 
and by February 2014 climaxed with armed conflict in the streets and massive social unrest.  
These activities eventually forced the President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, to flee the 
country and seek safety in Russia.  For Russian President Vladimir Putin, who had previously 
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commented in 2008 about “dismembering Ukraine…and detaching the Crimea…” this was the 
perfect opportunity.
158
  
The Military Occupation of Crimea 
 The operation to occupy Crimea began under the guise of a surprise ‘operational 
readiness’ inspection of the Western and Central military districts.  This action was ordered by 
Putin on 26 February 2014, and involved moving units of these districts to areas in other parts of 
Russia, far away from their home stations.  These large-scale movements “helped to cover the 
redeployment of several thousand troops of Spetsnaz and Airborne Troops to Crimea,” as well as 
the movement of “military units to the Ukrainian border as a form of pressure on Kiev to prevent 
it from using military force in Crimea.”159  The same day Russian troops, supported by armored 
personnel carriers, established a checkpoint about half way between from Sevastopol to 
Simferopol,” thereby separating the region from the remainder of Crimea.160  In addition, 
armored personnel carriers and their associated troops operated in Sevastopol near the naval 
base.
161
  The following day, 27 February 2014, the first Russian troops began to appear in 
Simferopol, the capital of the Crimea region, where they took over government offices and 
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erected barricades.
162
   By 28 February 2014, Russian troops were “guarding vital facilities in the 
region,” to include all government buildings and public venues, as well as Ukrainian Naval and 
Army instillations.
163
   
 On 1 March 2014, the Russian Federation Council unanimously “granted its consent for 
the use of armed forces in Ukraine,” which enabled the movement of larger contingents of 
conventional forces into the peninsula.
164
  As a result, “practically all combat-ready formations 
from the central part of the Western Military District,” as well as forces “from the Southern and 
Central Military Districts” were ordered to the Russian border with Ukraine.165  By 3 March 
2014, a little over five days after the first ‘little green men’ were seen in Crimea, over 16,000 
Russian troops were in the peninsula, where they “controlled all Crimean border posts, as well as 
military facilities” and the ferry terminal on the Kerch peninsula.166  It was this rapid-deployment 
of troops and equipment into Crimea and the Ukrainian border, as well “blocking Ukrainian 
forces on the peninsula,” which made it “practically impossible for Kiev to come up with any 
effective countermeasures.”167  Though the rapid occupation up to that point had been 
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accomplished without any violence, tensions flared on 3 March 2014 when Russian troops fired 
over top of 300 Ukrainian airmen during a standoff outside of the airbase at Belbek.
168
  On 12 
March 2014, the 18
th
 Separate Motorized Infantry Battalion from Chechnya arrived, after 
“having marched 900 kilometers to the Kerch Strait,” followed shortly afterwards by the 291st 
Artillery Brigade from Ingushetia.
169
  Days later, on 17 March 2014, residents of Crimea voted to 
join the Russian Federation, and the following day Russia officially annexed the Crimean 
peninsula.
170
 
 During this period, eastern Ukraine had also become a hub of separatist activity, 
including protests and the occupation of government buildings throughout the region.
171
  By 
April 2014 both the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of the Donbass began to call for a referendum 
to gain independence, akin to the previous actions in Crimea.   In response the government in 
Kiev, now mobilized for war, began operations in the region and “started to bring in troops to 
suppress the separatists.
172
  Despite requests from both the separatist forces in Donetsk and 
Lugansk, on 24 April 2014, the Russian Security Council officially determined not to send troops 
to support Ukrainian separatists and the military began substantial troop withdrawals from the 
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border with Ukraine by the beginning of May.
173
  On 1 June 2014, the Federation Council 
“withdrew its formal permission to use the army in Ukraine,” in response to a request from the 
Kremlin, thereby ‘officially’ ending the active use of the Russian military in the region. 
End State: Analysis of the Military Operation in Crimea 
 The Russian military operation in Crimea became “the first significant test for the 
reformed Armed Forces,” and the operational deployment of Russian forces “showed a very high 
level of combat readiness and mobility.”174  During the operation, Russia utilized various special 
operations forces and airborne units, who “seized key points on the peninsula, disarmed 
Ukrainian military forces, and took control of the territory.”175  Another unique aspect of the 
Russian operation was the use of civilian self-defense forces, which enabled Russia to “create 
conditions needed to legitimize further military action.”176    
 During the initial occupation of Crimea, the Russian operation—unlike during the 
previous conflict in Georgia—utilized squad and platoon-sized units, supported by wheeled 
armored personnel carriers, who moved swiftly throughout the region, and quickly established a 
perimeter that not only cut off Crimea from the mainland, but also isolated the over 18,000 
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Ukrainian service members stationed at various bases throughout the peninsula.
177
  Though large 
Russian armored brigades were available on the Ukrainian border, their presence was neither 
required, as Ukraine had no heavy armor in the region, nor would it have been conducive to the 
operation, as a Russian T-72 removes all options of plausible deniability.  Though Russia had 
previously struggled with joint operations, activities in Crimea highlighted a new level of inter-
service operations, as airborne units operated “effectively and in cooperation with other rapid-
reaction forces from the special-forces reconnaissance brigades and the marine infantry.”178  
Though often not mentioned, Russia also displayed a much more developed system of logistical 
support.  In the years since the Georgian campaign, Russia had worked to enhance “its strategic 
maneuver capabilities” and deployment of forces “over great distances,” which was 
demonstrated by the “swift and well organized” airlift of troops and equipment from across 
Russia, which “proved highly instrumental during the Ukrainian crisis.”179   
 However much better the showing by the Russian military in Crimea, the omnipresent 
issue of conscripts and kontraktniki resurfaced, and had an indirect affect on the readiness and 
utilization of certain military units.  As a result of large number of conscript troops within the 
forces and fewer kontraktniki, as well as the one year conscription service term, many units were 
not at full strength “due to both shortage of personnel in the majority of units and the cyclic 
nature of conscripts’ training,” and as a result the majority of the new permanent readiness 
                                                 
177
 Boltenkov and Shepovalenko, Russian Defense Arrangements in Crimea, 1. 
 
178
 Bettina Renz, “Russian Military Capability after 20 Years of Reform,” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 56, 
no. 3 (June-July 2014), 75. 
 
179
 Mikhail Barabanov, “Testing a ‘New Look’: Ukrainian Conflict and Military Reform in Russia,” 
Globalaffairs.ru, December 18, 2014, under “Ukraine: The Lessons of a War that Never Was,” 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Testing-a-New-Look-17213 
 
63 
 
 
brigades “could not send no more than two-thirds of their personnel to the operational area.”180  
Regardless though of this manpower issue, the overall intent of the ‘New Look’ military reforms 
had “proved correct;” Russian military analyst Mikhail Barabanov concluded that the Russian 
military fielded a “rather efficient permanent readiness force” that was capable of executing 
“large-scale operations in the post-Soviet space without mobilization or additional buildup.”181 
 Lastly, the Russian invasion and subsequent occupation of Crimea—as with Georgia 
previously—demonstrated more strongly than ever Russia’s stance against Western involvement 
and expansion into the neighboring regions of the Russian Federation.  With Crimea firmly in his 
grasp, and the eastern region of Ukraine dependent on Russian support, Putin has accentuated 
“his intention to keep Ukraine in Moscow’s orbit.”182  Russian officials also reaffirmed their 
commitment to ‘Russian citizens abroad’, and used this citizenship to “create a ‘protected’ 
population” in Crimea, which in turn enabled the Kremlin to redraw “the former Soviet borders 
in Russia’s favor.”183  In the end, by occupying and annexing Crimea, Russia has enhanced its 
“ability to protect its southern flank,”184 and more importantly, it has shifted the regional balance 
of power in its favor.   
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CHAPTER 5 
THE INFLUENCE OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND MILITARY REFORM ON THE 
MILITARY DOCTRINES 
 
We perceive some aspects of U.S. and NATO conduct that contradict the logic of modern 
developments, relying instead on the stereotypes of a bloc-based mentality.  Everyone 
understands what I am referring to—an expansion of NATO that includes the deployment of new 
military infrastructure with U.S.-drafted plans to establish a missile defense system in Europe.  I 
would not touch on this issue if these plans were not conducted in close proximity to Russian 
borders, if they did not undermine our security and global stability in general. 
—Vladimir Putin, Russia and the Changing World 
 
A reformed military is a foreign policy asset, a tool to support friendly regimes in Eurasia and, 
by implication, put pressure on those not fully aligned with Moscow. 
—Mark Galeotti, Reform of the Russian Military and Security Apparatus 
 
 
 The purpose of a military doctrine, as a working document for the armed forces, is to 
provide guidance on how to best utilize the countries military assets to both deter and conduct an 
armed conflict.  The military doctrine also “pursues the aim of sending a signal of some kind to 
foreign countries and the public.”185  The regional conflicts in Georgia and Crimea, though 
conducted in drastically contrasting operational fashion, represented the Russian response to 
eastward expansion of Western institutions, and the perceived threat by Russia of NATO and 
Western involvement in their periphery and exclusive sphere of influence.
186
  As a result, the 
2010 and 2014 Doctrines, each of which were developed after cessation of operations in the 
aforementioned regional conflicts, were directly influenced by, and because of, this perceived 
threat that ultimately led to military intervention as the ultimate expression of the Russian 
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position.  While both regional conflicts—and their impetus—had a direct influence on the 
Doctrines, the drastic military reforms which began in late 2008, for the most part, received little 
attention in either document. Despite the creation of permanent-readiness forces, in complete 
contradiction both documents continued to stress the requirements of a mobilization reserve and 
other such aspects similar to the force which they had so desperately wanted to part ways with.  
In this chapter, I will provide evidence to the impact of regional conflicts on the military 
doctrines, and then address the inattention towards, and conflicting treatment of, the military 
reforms.  
Regional Conflicts and the Doctrines 
 Though both the 2010 and 2014 Doctrines are mostly identical in format and intent, they 
each have resonating themes and specific language that can be attributed to the preceding 
regional conflict, which at the time of development of each document, were important 
influencing factors.  For the 2010 Doctrine, it was the continued tension over “the issue of 
NATO’s eastward enlargement,” and more specifically, the consideration of Georgian for NATO 
membership.
187
  For the 2014 Doctrine, while reiterating the threat of an expansive NATO, it 
was the perceived actions of the West in Ukraine, specifically subversive actions by Western 
agencies in activities that “result in the overthrow of the legitimate government bodies whose 
policies threaten the interest of the Russian Federation.”188 
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 This continued fear and anger over NATO expansion and Western engagement, however, 
is not altogether unwarranted, and it deserves to be mentioned briefly how NATO ultimately 
came to its highly visible place in the 2010 and 2014 Doctrines.  In the original 1993 Military 
Doctrine of the Russian Federation the “word ‘NATO’ was not even mentioned,” but rather just 
the “expansion of military blocs and alliances” as a possible military danger.189  By the time of 
the second military doctrine in 2000, Russia “had become more critical of the NATO expansion 
process,” but it still did not explicitly name NATO in the document, rather it stated that 
“increasing groups of foreign forces in the vicinity of Russian borders posed the main external 
threat.”190  By the time of the 2010 Doctrine, NATO had expanded eastward two more times and 
publicly considered membership of both Georgia and Ukraine, which finally resulted in NATO 
and the eastward expansion being listed as a military danger.
191
  
 The 2008 Russian-Georgian War, as discussed in chapter 2, was Russia’s redline for 
NATO expansion.  The 2010 Doctrine, accepted into law less than two years later, directly 
                                                                                                                                                             
that “we shall provide an adequate and well-measured response to NATO’s expansion towards Russian borders, and 
we shall take note of [the West] setting up a global missile defense architecture and building up its arsenal of 
precision-guided weapons.”   
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reflected Russia’s stance towards this expansion.192  Though the document does list other NATO 
activities, such as missile defense, there are certain passages which can be inferred to be a direct 
result of the conflict in Georgia.  While not overtly stating the possible NATO membership of 
Georgia, the 2010 Doctrine in turn noted the moving of “the military infrastructure of NATO 
member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the 
bloc [emphasis added].”193  Indeed, Georgian officials had been actively campaigning for 
membership.
194
  Due to the fact that Russia viewed NATO expansion into Georgia as 
undermining their regional stability (and henceforth their influence) the 2010 Doctrine included 
as a military threat “attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to 
undermine strategic stability.”195   
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 Georgian military action, bolstered in part by the possibility of impending NATO 
membership, can further be recognized in the document in the references both to the “use of 
military force on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation,” and to the 
“presence of seats of armed conflict and the escalation of such conflicts on the territories of 
states contiguous with the Russian Federation.”196  In the category of a military threat, being 
even higher in scale than the previously mentioned, the document also included the “stepping up 
of the activity of the Armed Forces of individual states involving partial or complete 
mobilization,” very similar to the path to military action taken by Georgia prior to their 
movement of troops into South Ossetia.
197
   
 The 2010 Doctrine also represented “an attempt to integrate lessons from the war with 
Georgia,” and to utilize them in the document when they advanced “Russia’s conception of itself 
as a power once again on the rise.”198  Specifically, the ability of the Russian Federation, listed 
within the military policy section, to utilize forces and troops abroad to enforce their sphere of 
influence in the form of collective security agreements, but more importantly, to “ensure the 
protection of its citizens located beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.”199  This group of 
protected people, to include Russian-speakers, was the impetus for the military action by Russia 
in 2008, along with responding to the initial Georgian advances into South Ossetia.
200
  As a 
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result, this concept was specifically listed in the 2010 Doctrine as a legitimate stand-alone task 
within the military policy, and a task of the armed forces both during peacetime and in time of 
war.  These sections within the 2010 Doctrine, along with the associated legal framework 
provided by the November 2009 Federal Law on the Amendments to the Federal Law on 
Defence of the Russian Federation, gave Russia the “right of unilateral military intrusion into 
any country in which Russian citizens reside on a permanent or temporary basis under a wide set 
of arbitrary constructed circumstances.”201  The protection of Russian citizens abroad, and the 
perceived threat from NATO were the most influential components of the regional conflict in 
Georgia; as a result of the conflict, the 2010 Doctrine served as both a warning to continued 
NATO expansion and public announcement of the reestablishment of their sphere of influence. 
 The 2014 Doctrine, coming into effect nine months after the ‘official’ annexation of 
Crimea, continued to reflect the perceived threat of NATO.  Russia once again denoted with a 
swift military response their objection to what they perceived was NATO/Western expansion 
into Ukraine, an area of traditional Russian influence.
202
  While the regional conflict in Crimea 
and Ukraine did not prompt any new language in the 2014 Doctrine concerning NATO per se it 
did, however, demonstrate—in the eyes of Russia—that NATO finally attained the spot that 
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“was allocated for it in the 2010 Doctrine.”203   In effect, the influence of the Crimean conflict 
was to further confirm Russian perceptions of a NATO threat, which forced “Moscow to review 
its military doctrine,” because of both the “expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe” and the 
ongoing “crisis situation in neighboring Ukraine.”204   
 The regional conflict in Crimea and Ukraine, though, was influential in providing the 
impetus for new language in the 2014 Doctrine specific to perceived external Western influence 
in regards to undermining regional stability.  In the section on main external military dangers, the 
2014 Doctrine added “subversive activities of special services and organizations,” alluding to the 
strong belief in Russia of Western organizations providing both arms and monetary support to 
the Ukrainian government.
205
  The ousting of Yanukovich and the instillation of a new, more 
Western-oriented government is also included in the document as the establishment of regimes 
resulting from the “overthrow of the legitimate government bodies,” within the Russian sphere of 
influence, and “whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation.”206    The 
continuing proxy war between Russia and Ukraine in the Donbass region, and the forces 
involved, was also annotated in the 2014 Doctrine whereby it noted the use of “foreign private 
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military companies in the areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation.”207  The 
propaganda war by both sides found its way into the document as well, which Russia noted was 
the social media “impact on the population, especially young citizens of the country.”208   
 The other major influence of the regional conflict in Ukraine was as an re-affirmation in 
the 2014 Doctrine of Russian commitment to the protection of their citizens abroad, and in the 
case of Crimea, Russian-speakers.  With the catalyst for military action in Crimea being the 
protection of Russian citizens and Russian-speakers, the 2014 Doctrine maintained within the 
military policy section what is considered the “lawful use of the Armed Forces, other troops and 
bodies…to ensure the protection of its citizens outside the Russian Federation.”209  The success 
of the security forces, who appeared almost from nowhere throughout Crimea in late February 
2014, was recognized, and therefore reiterated in the 2014 Doctrine as a main task of the armed 
forces, that being the “protection of citizens of the Russian Federation outside the Russian 
Federation from armed attacks against them,” further reinforcing Russia’s option to use troops 
abroad.
210
     
 Both the 2010 and 2014 Doctrines were influenced, in one fashion or another, by the 
regional conflicts in Georgia and Crimea.  The wording of the 2010 Doctrine was greatly 
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influenced by the previous conflict in Georgia, from the strong language towards NATO, to the 
restoration of Russian influence in the periphery with the ability to deploy forces abroad.  The 
influence of the conflict in Crimea, on the other hand, on the 2014 Doctrine can really only be 
seen in the addition of language towards outside (Western) subversive activities in countries 
bordering the Russian Federation.  The biggest impact of the conflict in Crimea, however, is that 
it served as an affirmation of what Russia already perceived to be truths—the expansion of 
NATO into their sphere of influence, and the threat to Russian citizens and Russian-speakers in 
the region.
211
  As a result, these perceptions were carried over into the 2014 Doctrine.   
Military Reform and the Doctrines 
 As I have shown, the military reforms which began in late 2008 involved a drastic 
reduction in the size of the Russian military, the restructuring of military formations, as well as 
the development of new weapon systems and upgrading of current models, all in an attempt to 
create a new ‘Russian’ permanent-readiness force, and finally remove all traces of the old 
‘Soviet’ forces.  Despite the fact that the ‘New Look’ reforms were the most ambitious overhaul 
of the Russian military ever attempted to date, the 2010 Doctrine “completely failed to mention 
these reform processes.”212  The revised 2014 Doctrine, regardless of the “reforms that actually 
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succeeded in recent years,” not to mention their operational use in Crimea, made no additional 
mention either.
213
  Conversely, both the 2010 and 2014 Doctrine continued to stress the previous 
Soviet-model mobilization capacity of the armed forces, as well as in the economy and defense 
industry, almost as if the reforms had never occurred, and the next large-scale global conflict was 
a distinct possibility.
214
   
 In both Doctrines, mobilization and mobilization readiness are mentioned throughout: as 
a main task for the armed forces; as a main task of the military organization; and in the 
construction of the armed forces.  Even more contradictory (and confusing), the 2014 Doctrine 
included a section within the military policy portion titled “mobilization preparation and 
mobilization readiness”; in the 2010 Doctrine these sections were titled just “military 
planning.”215  Though this requirement for a mobilization-style force is listed throughout both 
Doctrines, the permanent-readiness concept did still appear in limited locations, often 
contradicting each other within the same section.
216
   
 The 2010 Doctrine section on the main priorities of the development of the military 
organization, called for “the necessary degree of manning, equipment, and support for 
permanent-readiness large formations,” yet at the same time the need “to develop the 
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mobilization base of the military organization and support the mobilization deployment of the 
Armed Forces.”217  Even more contradicting to the ongoing military reforms, in the same section 
it required the military organization to “improve the quality of cadre training,” despite the fact 
that disbanding of the cadre system was among the first major actions of the reforms.
218
  This 
inconsistency continued in the section concerning the structural development of the armed 
forces, as the 2010 Doctrine required “a rational correlation of permanent-readiness large 
formations and troop units to large formations and troop units intended for the mobilization 
deployment of the Armed Forces,” followed as well in the very next sentence by the need to 
“improve the quality of operational, combat, special, and mobilization training.”219  
 Mobilization requirements also reached into the sections covering economic and defense 
industry requirements.  A required task of military-economic support for defense in the 2010 
Doctrine was to “provide timely and full resource support” for the development of the armed 
forces “for combat, special, and mobilizational training.”220  The defense industry was tasked 
with “ensuring the mobilizational readiness of the defense industry complex,” as well as to 
“create, develop, and maintain mobilizational capacities,” and lastly to “prepare equipment 
intended for delivery to the Armed Forces and other troops on mobilization.”221  The result was a 
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document “distinctly out of step with the military itself,” due to the lack of “consideration for the 
fundamental transformation of the Russian Armed Forces.”222 
 The 2014 Doctrine, like its predecessor, continued the trend of conflicting tasks.  Unlike 
the inclusion in the previous document, the 2014 Doctrine removed the requirement for 
improved cadre training as a priority of the development of the military organization, though it 
still maintained mention of a permanent-readiness force, as well as the contradiction of both a 
permanent-readiness force and a mobilization force in the section on the structural development 
of the armed forces.  The striking difference is the mobilization preparation and mobilization 
readiness section of the 2014 Doctrine.  This section concentrated heavily on mobilization 
readiness, with mobilization training designed “to perform mobilization plans in a timely 
duration.”223  The main objective of this mobilization training is to prepare all organs of the 
economy and government for “protection of the state against an armed attack.”224   In fact, this 
mobilization planning resulted in a series of eight completely new requirements concerning the 
tasks for the armed forces, the economic sector, defense sector, and civilian authorities during 
time of war, completely replacing the previous six military planning tasks of the 2010 
Doctrine.
225
  And just like the 2010 Doctrine, the 2014 Doctrine continued to list the 
mobilization requirements for both the economic and defense sectors. 
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 This inclusion, and continued importance, of mobilization requirements in both the 2010 
and 2014 Doctrines can be interpreted as a possible division between military and civilian 
leadership over both the direction and purpose of the current force structure.  The civilian 
leadership, with the support of a few key military officials, desired a smaller and more 
professional force, which would be more adaptable to current and future foreign policy 
requirements.  However, due to previously discussed manpower issues, conscription was 
increased.  With the increased prevalence of NATO as a threat, the inclusion of mobilization 
requirements can be seen as a concession to the military leadership, who still believe that their 
“primary role is to prepare for the day when it must draft hundreds of thousands of conscripts in 
response to a World War II-like conventional invasion.”226 
 Despite the overwhelming direction in both Doctrines towards mobilization, there are a 
few sections within each that paralleled the ongoing military reforms.  Both Doctrines required 
the construction of “modern armaments, military and specialized equipment.”227  They both also 
required an optimization of “military educational institutions,” and an improved “level of social 
support for servicemen,” as well as “improving the system of military service using servicemen 
carrying out military service under contract and under conscription,” while “ensuring the combat 
readiness of large formations…being filled with military personnel undergoing military service 
under contract.”228  However, regardless of these nuanced mentions of military reform concepts, 
and the profound impact that the actual military reforms had on the Russian ground forces, their  
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overall influence on the both the 2010 and 2014 Doctrines is negligible due to the mobilization 
requirements contained within each.   
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CHAPTER 6 
THE PRESENT-DAY FORCE AND FUTURE DIRECTION 
 
I am convinced that global security can only be achieved through cooperation with Russia rather 
than by attempts to push it into the background, weaken its geopolitical position or compromise 
its defenses. 
—Vladimir Putin, Russia and the Changing World 
 
 
 
 The present-day Russian Armed Forces, specifically the ground forces, represent a much 
more competent and capable military force, demonstrated both operationally in Crimea and 
Eastern Ukraine, as well during recent mass military exercises near the Baltic region.  That is not 
to say, however, that the Russian ground forces are a fully developed and modernized military 
force.   While they have been subjected to modernization reforms, they are still challenged by 
certain organizational and supply issues which have impeded them from realizing their full 
potential.  Despite their operational and tactical success in Crimea, they are still grappling with 
how to best prepare for future regional conflicts and the continued threat of an expansive NATO, 
while determining the proper balance between a reform-driven smaller, contract, permanent-
readiness force, and a larger, conscript, mobilization army of the current military doctrine. 
The Russian Military of Today 
 The Russian military, which evolved through several years of military reforms, displayed 
itself for the world during the annexation of Crimea in 2014.  Though the operation mainly 
utilized smaller special operations groups and airborne forces, and not the large brigade-heavy 
permanent-readiness forces, it nonetheless demonstrated a tactical proficiency and exactness of 
operation, and showed to expert observers “that it was capable of achieving a favorable strategic 
79 
 
 
outcome before other actors could intervene.”229  The Russian military has also been conducting 
‘snap’ readiness-drills across the country, but most frequently in the region near Ukraine, the 
enclave of Kaliningrad, and especially the territory bordering the Baltic States.  The most recent 
exercise in March 2015, which coincided with ongoing NATO exercises, included over 45,000 
troops and 3,000 vehicles, most of which were rapidly deployed over great distances.
230
     
 These recent actions by the Russian military suggest that Russia “is much closer to 
having the military it needs,” both in terms of operational readiness and operational use.231  This 
operational force, though, notwithstanding the success in Crimea and the impressive display of 
military force with recent exercises, has personnel and procurement/development concerns 
which could prevent them from attaining an operational force as originally envisioned with the 
military reforms, and with the capacity to act as directed by the current military doctrine. 
The Continual Thorn of Conscription 
 One of the issues which the reforms aimed to reconcile was the reliance on a conscription 
force, though due to the declining number of kontraktniki, the Russian military had no choice but 
to increase conscription.  The result was shorter, one-year contracts, with two annual call-ups in 
the spring and fall.  This strategy resulted in the Russian military of today, with a smaller 
kontraktniki force which forms the core of the larger permanent-readiness units, the VDV and 
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special operations forces such as those used in Crimea, as well as “posts involving more 
challenging tasks,” and the larger conscript force, which fills the remainder of the positions, 
mainly in the ground forces.
232
  This current force composition results in a Russian military that 
is “neither a conscript military nor a professional one.”233   
 The current force composition of combining conscripts and kontraktniki, though, for the 
time being is considered Russia’s “most realistic option.”234  Regardless of whether the military 
and/or civilian leadership want a fully professional force, there are many other determinate 
factors which, in the end, have to be addressed and adjustments made from there.  The biggest 
issue is the financial aspect.  Professional militaries cost money—a lot of it—and between higher 
pay, better living allowances and greater social provisions, many countries military budgets 
cannot absorb this impact without affecting the economy in other places.  The other issue facing 
the Russian military is the political factor.  As in many other countries, conscription is seen as an 
institution to develop spiritual and patriotic traditions of the country.  And for a country such as 
Russia, which is abound with reminders of sacrifice during the Great Patriotic War, this is indeed 
a moral obligation. 
 Russia has, for the most part, made this work over the past few years with the 
kontraktniki performing most of the technical and high-skill functions, and the conscript soldier’s 
in positions such as infantrymen or tank crewman.  Recently, there has been discussion of once 
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again extending the term of conscript service beyond a year which in turn would give the 
Russian military more use of the conscript soldier once he has achieved basic proficiency in his 
position.
235
  If this will actually change remains unforeseen, but regardless of the current 
situation, the use of a mixed force will continue “for the foreseeable future.”236 
Procurement and the Defense Industry 
 The Russian military of today, as directed by both the reforms and the 2014 Doctrine, 
requires new and technologically advanced weapons and equipment.  While the defense sector 
has shown that it can update existing legacy platforms with newer technology, the potential issue 
is their ability to develop and produce state of the art communication and information 
technology, which will be required for all new projects going forth.
237
  The Russian defense 
industry of today, however, is affected by outmoded military production equipment, inadequate 
to produce new weapons platforms and associated components, with “more than two-thirds of 
the lasts, lathes, and other machine tools…having been in service for more than twice their 
allotted life spans.”238  To remedy this, the Russian government is conducting “a major upgrade 
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and retooling effort for the Russian defense industry,” which is budgeted through 2020.239  For 
the past several years, the defense industry has supported itself through contract orders of tanks, 
jets and helicopters to countries such as India, but has reinvested little in innovation research.  
However, Russia has committed 13 trillion rubles for procurement of new equipment by 2020 of 
both current models, as well as brand-new platforms.
240
  With these combined actions, more 
practical decisions “on equipment purchasing and disposal are now being made,” that in turn 
“appear more closely related to Russia’s force optimization goals and purchasing capability.”241  
A major segment of these purchases are in new modern weapons systems, due to the fact that 
Russia was “lagging much behind the advance countries of the world.”242   
 One area of procurement specific to the ground forces is the development of the Armata 
Universal Combat Platform, designed to replace the T-90 as the main Russian battle tank.  The 
final delivery to the Russian army of a three-year contract for the T-90A, produced by 
Uralvagonzavod, was completed in 2011, thereby ending delivery of new Soviet-legacy tanks 
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into the armored force.
243
  Under development by Uralvagonzavod for five years, manufacture 
was finalized “for the first batch of Armata tanks and heavy personnel carriers” in February 
2015, and “included in Russia’s 2015 defense order.”244  Starting in 2016, the Russian army 
“plans large-scale purchases of tanks and armored vehicles,” with the desired goal of “replacing 
70% of infantry and tanks brigades’ equipment by 2020.”245        
 The Armata platform is unique in that the vehicle chassis will serve as the basis for a 
“main battle tank, infantry combat vehicle, a heavy APC, a tank support combat vehicle, an 
armored repair-and-evacuation vehicle,” and various self-propelled artillery pieces.246  All 
together, the contract for the Armata calls for the delivery of 2,300 units by 2020.
247
  In addition 
to the Armata, the Russian defense industry is also developing the Boomerang 8x8 wheeled 
armored vehicle to phase-in in place of the current BTR-90 as well as the Kurganets-25 tracked 
infantry fighting vehicle, designed to replace the “BMP and BMD and MTLB and other types of 
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tracked armored platforms.”248  All of these weapon systems represent not only a quantum leap 
forward in technology, but also are more aligned with the desired permanent-readiness and rapid-
response brigades of heavy, medium, and light composition. 
Operational Support 
 To provide support for regional operations such as the Crimean annexation and the 
ongoing separatist campaign in Eastern Ukraine, the Russian military has developed institutional 
structures which will increase their operational and tactical capabilities.  The first major 
institution was the creation of a Russian Special Operations Command (Komandovanie Sil 
Spet sial’nykh Operat si ), that will organize and deploy independent operating combat units in 
combat operations, which “have a high political significance and do not require the use of all the 
instruments at the disposal of the Armed Forces.”249  Though it was established in March 2013, it 
is quite significant due to the appearance of various special operations forces in the Crimean 
operation, and is an indication of the importance of these types of forces for any future local or 
regional conflicts, where they could be used to “achieve a broad range of objectives, such as 
“organizing local residents into self-defense squads” or “eliminating rebel leaders.”250   
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 In order to better coordinate the activities off all forces involved in defense of the Russian 
Federation, in 2014 Russia established the National Defense Control Center.  This command, 
located in the heart of Moscow, replaced the previous Central Command of the General Staff.
251
  
This institution is something very new for Russia, and it demonstrates the renewed effort by 
Russia to establish greater synthesis between military services, and across territorial defense 
agencies, with “a primus inter pares role for the Russian General Staff.”252  This center is used to 
monitor all activities across Russia and can, during time of crisis, serve as a national command 
center.  The importance of this cannot be overstated, as the creation of this command allows 
Russia to not only prepare a strategic defense, but also coordinate operational and tactical 
activities within their periphery utilizing all assets within their arsenal, thereby ensuring an 
overwhelmingly positive outcome for Russia. 
Operational Focus 
 The Russian military of today is a much smaller force than several years ago; however it 
has proven that the current force, built around rapidly deployable permanent-readiness brigades, 
is sufficient “without massive advantages in numbers” since it can be rapidly deployed for 
various operations and exercises, and this leaner force is “flexible enough for a variety of 
missions.”253  The present force, as demonstrated in Crimea, has the potential to conduct 
operations in the Russian periphery, using the forces at their disposal, with a high probability of 
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similar results.
254
  This being said the operations in Crimea and in Ukraine “do not suggest that 
the Russian military is capable of competing in conventional warfare” beyond their periphery, 
and even less against NATO.
255
  Though the Russian military has a substantial ground force, 
their ability to project this power beyond their periphery is hindered by a lack of substantial 
heavy lift air and naval assets, which are required to not only move the combat forces and service 
and support assets to the theatre of operation, but maintain a continual supply of logistical 
support as well.
256
  And while NATO is openly listed as a threat to Russia in the 2014 Doctrine, 
the reforms which took place were designed with a focus on Russia’s sphere of influence, and 
the smaller, rapidly-deployable permanent-readiness structure it required to maintain dominance 
in this region, rather than a large-scale engagement with NATO; the language in the 2014 
Doctrine granting the right to utilize nuclear weapons in the event of an aggressive conventional 
confrontation cannot be overlooked either.
257
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A 21
st
 Century Military: The Future of the Russian Armed Forces 
 The current Russian military is faced with the dilemma, not unlike military forces 
throughout the world, of how to plan for and develop their armed forces for unforeseen threats 
both in the near future, and beyond.  For the future Russian military, the use of conventional 
military forces will “remain mandatory and characteristic of the armed struggle, regardless of 
size, and whether it is tactical or strategic.”258  Therefore, Russia will need to maintain focus on 
these forces, as they will for the foreseeable future be the main contributor to ensuring success 
during conflict.  These conventional forces, particularly the ground forces, need to further 
enhance operational activation ability of their permanent-readiness units, in par with the ability 
of similar NATO forces.
259
  This will not only provide a greater deterrent to continued NATO 
expansion, but will also allow portions of these forces to be allocated to joint CSTO or UN 
peacekeeping operations, within the guidelines of the current military doctrine.
260
  Also, contrary 
to the 2014 Doctrine, Russia does not need to focus on a large strategic reserve force.  The 
training and maintenance of a large reserve force, argues Russian military historian Boris 
Sokolov, is “absolutely not necessary, because it is focused on the impossible scenario” of a 
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large-scale war.
261
  The current, smaller, force structure is more than sufficient to achieve the 
geopolitical aims of Russia now, and for the foreseeable future.  With the current commitment to 
the development and operational deployment of new weapons systems, this increased military 
capacity will more than offset the quantitatively smaller manpower component.  In the unlikely 
event of a war of this magnitude, Russia will continue to maintain a sizeable nuclear weapons 
inventory. 
 Russia will need to continue to refine and expand on the reforms that were initiated in 
2008 in order to field “genuinely world-class forces able to match those of the first-rank powers” 
well into the future.
262
  However, despite recent developments and advancements towards new 
weapons, and the renewed efforts of the defense industry, for Russia to fully “catch up with the 
most advanced technologies will be a long, drawn out process.”263  One area which requires 
immediate attention, and will have a long-term impact on conventional ground force operations, 
is the development of a GLONASS-integrated command and control systems for all ground force 
assets.  This system, which could be vehicle-mounted, would provide Russian commanders with 
real-time positioning and status of not only their forces, but enemy forces as well.  As a result, 
the “combat effectiveness of units with information management networks” would “increase 
substantially.”264   
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 Russia needs to continue to orientate their conventional ground forces along the eastern 
and southern periphery, for the time being, this is the region with the highest probability of 
confrontation.  Though a conflict of any sort with NATO is highly unlikely, due to the increased 
tension with NATO Russia needs to maintain a credible ground force contingent in order to 
confirm their influence within the region, which will also serve as a powerful deterrent for any 
country in the region contemplating possible NATO membership.  However, Russia cannot lose 
focus on the other unspoken threat of China.
265
  Regardless of the perceived threat of NATO, 
China is the one military power that could directly overwhelm Russia with an extremely large 
conventional military force.  The production capability and manpower reserves of China are 
enormous, and unlike Russia, their economy is currently in a much better position to support a 
large-scale conflict of this sort.      
 Lastly, Russia needs to determine what, for them, is a ‘modern’ force.  For Russia, a 
modern military does not have to be a military that resembles, or is even similar to, 
contemporary Western forces, and therefore does not “equate to Russia explicitly remodeling its 
military along Western lines.”266  The ‘modern’ force that Russia requires is one that will enable 
it to achieve its’ foreign policy objectives, that provides for a proper defense of their vast 
borders, that is equipped with the right combination of weapons and equipment, manned by a 
force that is properly trained and competent in its use, and which is able to be properly supported 
by the economy.  Since Russia has never given any specific benchmark to serve as an indicator 
of their attainment of a ‘modern’ force, this gives the “Russian armed forces considerable leeway 
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in deciding when to declare that this criterion has been met.”267  It is also wrong “to assume that 
there is an ideal type of modern military,” or what exactly a Russian military “for the twenty-first 
century should look like.”268  The Russian military force of the 21st century needs to have a 
focused and common stance, which takes into consideration the structural composition of their 
current forces, including the introduction of new equipment, as well as the orientation of the 
2014 Doctrine, thereby ensuring their ability to respond equally to any escalation of force or 
perceived threats, while still reinforcing a stronger, influential and resurgent Russia.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
If, instead of the dominance in the world of two superpowers, a so-called leadership of only one 
superpower or group of leading powers is established under some pretext, then nothing will 
change in the world, and new sources of confrontation will appear to replace the old ones. 
—M.A. Gareev, On Military Doctrine and the Military Reform in Russia 
 
The armed struggle—one of the fundamental pillars of war, it is a process organized by 
application of the warring states, its armed forces or part of them: to achieve through armed 
violence the aims of the war: economic, political and others, which are core to the struggle and 
our understanding of why we are fighting…without fighting the armed struggle simply ceases to 
be such. 
V.V. Babich, K   r d l     u form voennykh (boevykh) de stvi  
 
 
 
 From the summer of 2008 until the present-day, the Russian military has been subjected 
to several transformative events.  These included the regional conflicts in Georgia and 
Crimea/Eastern Ukraine, the ongoing ‘New Look’ military reforms, as well as both the 2010 and 
2014 Military Doctrines of the Russian Federation.  These events, separate yet intertwined, have 
influenced and modified one another, resulting in the present-day Russian military force. 
 The first significant event, during the period of observation, was in Georgia in August of 
2008, where the conventional ground forces, in conjunction with air and naval assets, advanced 
into South Ossetia in response to Georgian military activities in that region, eventually invading 
into the northern territories of Georgia itself.  While the campaign lasted only seven days and 
was seen as an overwhelming victory for the Russian forces, the war also accentuated the overall 
poor condition of their equipment and the need for more modern and advance weapons platforms 
and technologies, thereby providing the catalyst for the ‘New Look’ military reforms.  The 
regional conflict was also the first prominent stand by Russia against the eastward expansion of 
NATO, and a reaffirmation of the Russian sphere of influence.   
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 Following the war, the military reforms began in earnest.  With the desire to remove all 
vestiges of the Soviet-legacy force, the reforms focused on several key areas, to include force 
readiness, structure and composition, hardware and equipment, and personnel composition.  New 
permanent-readiness brigades were developed, designed not only to be quickly deployed 
throughout the Russian periphery, but due to the new brigade structure, contained the required 
assets to be more self-sufficient and adaptable to future regional conflicts.  The size of the 
military was greatly reduced, with a renewed emphasis on professional soldiers and the 
development of a non-commissioned officer corps.  In addition, current equipment was 
modernized, and new military technology and equipment was introduced to the force.   
 Less than a year and a half later, in February 2010, the first new military doctrine in over 
ten years was produced.  As a result of the Georgian war and the perceived threat of NATO 
expansion, the new 2010 Doctrine prominently classified NATO as a military threat, and the 
main external military danger to the Russian Federation.  This increased threat perception also 
resulted in the affirmation in the 2010 Doctrine of a more active role by Russia in their 
periphery, both to protect Russian citizens and Russian-speakers, as well as to assert their 
position to a Russian sphere of influence.  However, regardless of the overwhelming impact of 
the recent conflict in Georgia on the 2010 Doctrine, the radical overhaul of the military forces 
which it was designed to guide and direct, hardly received mention.  Rather, in complete 
contradiction, the 2010 Doctrine continued to stress the pre-reform Soviet-style mobilization 
concept. 
 By 2013, the Russian military had undergone most of the structural, personnel, 
institutional and equipment changes required by the ‘New Look’ reforms.  Though the force that 
had evolved as a result stood in stark contrast to the force which invaded Georgia, the process 
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had also involved compromises and changes from the original concept, most notably the need to 
increase conscription due to manpower shortages.  Despite this, the new force was much more 
capable and professional, and before long, would be tested in combat.   
 The perceived threat of NATO and Western expansion into the Russian sphere of 
influence once again resulted in military action in March 2014 in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.  
As a result of a failure of Ukrainian President Yanukovich to sign an association agreement with 
the European Union, and the resulting mass demonstrations and overthrow of the current 
government, Russia began a military operation to occupy and control the peninsula of Crimea, all 
under the pretense of protecting native Russian-speakers in the region.  Unlike the previous 
operation in Georgia, the military campaign in Crimea involved various Special Forces and 
airborne units, as well as small squad-sized forces utilizing armored personnel carriers, to both 
quickly cut off the peninsula from the mainland, and isolate the Ukrainian military forces.  And 
unlike the previous conflict, the execution of the operation was commensurate with any 
contemporary Western military operation.   
 After the official annexation of Crimea by Russia, the region of Eastern Ukraine 
collapsed into a separatist conflict between pro-Russian and Ukrainian military forces.  Amidst 
the increased tension between NATO and the West on one side, and Russia on the other, a new 
military doctrine appeared.  The new 2014 Doctrine, signed into law 26 December 2014, 
contained many of the same themes and direction of the previous doctrine, to include the 
prevalence of NATO as a military threat, as well as to the protection of Russian citizens abroad 
and the commitment to the Russian sphere of influence.  Russia also included stronger wording 
on the commitment to collective security, which included not only the CSTO, but the BRICS and 
the Asia-Pacific region, confirming not only their commitment to regional defense, but 
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announcing their intentions for a more global role as well.  While the conflict in Crimea not only 
reaffirmed Russian suspicions towards the West and NATO, the suspicions of Russia over 
Western involvement in both Crimea and Eastern Ukraine were specifically included in the 2014 
Doctrine.  These included the use of foreign private military companies, irregular armed groups, 
subversive groups and externally funded social movements, perceived by Russia as being used to 
undermine their influence and position in the region.    
 This culmination of events resulted in the present-day structure of the Russian Armed 
Forces.  This current force, specifically the ground forces, is a capable, competent and 
modernized force, which has been demonstrated operationally in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, 
and during recent major military exercises.  Despite these accomplishments, the Russian ground 
forces still face areas which challenged their ability to realize their full potential, most notably 
the debate over conscription, which will continue to be an area of contention for the foreseeable 
future.  The conventional ground forces are also contending with how to best address the 
requirements and direction of the current military doctrine.  Their new force composition of 
permanent-readiness brigades are optimized for the demands of local and regional conflicts, 
while the 2014 Doctrine maintains focus on the military threat of NATO, and the possible large-
scale conflict that it would entail.  The current force is also a smaller force, meant to rely more 
on better-trained professional soldiers with modern and technologically advanced weapons 
systems, while the 2014 Doctrine maintains the requirement for a large mobilization force.   
 While the military reforms had the most obvious impact on the structure and composition 
of the Russian Armed Forces and the least impact on the military doctrines, it was the two 
regional conflicts in Georgia and Crimea, and the perceived threat of NATO expansion, which in 
turn had the most direct influence on both the 2010 and 2014 Doctrines, consequently leaving the 
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Russian military in a state of ambiguity.  This in itself can be considered the ultimate lesson of 
this project.  The current Russian military force, as well as the force which it will develop in the 
future, will be guided and directed by this continued threat of expansion by NATO, the West, 
and the regional conflict(s) that will inevitably occur as a result.  The modernization process 
which has been forced upon the Russian military, while of limited importance to the doctrine, 
had the explicit effect of developing a much more efficient, capable, and usable force to not only 
deter the expansion of NATO, but if required, halting by force.  It is only by understanding how 
future regional conflicts and challenges to Russian hegemony in the territory of the former USSR 
will determine the orientation and posture of the Russian military, that the influence of regional 
conflicts and military reform on the Military Doctrines of the Russian Federation can truly be 
appreciated.        
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